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This dissertation consists of two essays investigating the trading by institutions and its 
impact on the stock market. 
In the first essay, I investigate why changes in institutional breadth predict return.  I first 
show that changes in breadth are positively associated with abnormal returns over the following 
four quarters.  I then demonstrate that this return predictability can be attributed to the 
information about the firms’ future operating performance.  When I examine different types of 
institutions independently, I find that the predictive power varies across the population of 
institutions.  More specifically, institutions that follow active management style are better able to 
predict future returns than the passive institutions, and their predictive power appears to be 
associated with information about future earnings growth.  These findings are consistent with the 
information hypothesis that changes in breadth of institutional ownership can predict return 
because they contain information about the fundamental value of firms. 
In the second essay, I examine institutional herding behavior and its impact on stock 
prices.  I document that herds by institutions usually last for more than one quarter and that herds 
occur more frequently for small and medium size stocks.  I find that after herds end, there are 
reversals in stocks returns for up to four quarters.  The magnitude of reversals is positively 
related to the duration of herding, and negatively related to the price impact of current herding 
activity.  This pattern in returns prevails for all sub-periods examined and is concentrated in 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Institutions are long believed to be sophisticated investors whose trading contains 
information about future performance of stocks.  As the number of institutions and the size of the 
assets under their management increase significantly over time, their trading could influence 
stock prices through its impact on the market supply and demand.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand the institutional trading behavior and its relation with stock returns.   
It is documented in the literature that current aggregate trading by institutions could 
predict the future stock returns for up to four quarters.  In the following chapter, I evaluate three 
hypotheses that could potentially explain this returns predictability, namely short sale constraint, 
information and investor recognition.  Taking advantage of the relation between stock returns 
and the future operating performance of firms, I document that return predictability appears to be 
associated with the superior information institutions possess at the time they trade.   
In the second part of the dissertation, I examine the tendency that institutions follow each 
other in their trades, or herd in trades.  This behavior could increase the volatility of stock prices, 
especially, when herds are not associated with information.  So far, the literature has focused on 
the trading by institutions within a single quarter and found very limited evidence for such 
behavior.  Employing a time dependent technique to identify herds, I find that it is common for 
institutions to engage in multi-quarter herds and that herding may destabilize stocks prices.     
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CHAPTER TWO: CHANGES IN BREADTH OF OWNERSHIP 
AND INFORMATION 
2.1. Introduction 
Several recent studies have documented that changes in institutional ownership can 
predict returns for up to twelve months.  For example, Wermers (1999) documents that stocks 
that mutual funds buy outperform stocks they sell by four percent during the following six 
months.  Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) find that a strategy to short stocks that mutual 
funds sell most and long stocks they buy most generates an abnormal return of six percent in the 
next four quarters.  Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) document that future stock returns and changes 
in breadth of mutual fund ownership are positively correlated, and that the difference in 12-
month returns between stocks with the largest increases and those with the largest reductions in 
breadth is about five percent.1 
While the return predictability by changes in institutional ownership in general, and by 
changes in institutional breadth in particular, is not subject to much controversy, there is no 
agreement on the reason for this predictive power.  Three different explanations have been 
proposed.  The information explanation is formed naturally on the extensive literature on the 
sophistication of institutional investors.2 Formally, it proposes that because institutions are smart 
and trade on information about firm, changes in their ownership predict return.  The second 
explanation is proposed by Lehavy and Sloan (2005) who argue that return predictability by 
changes in institutional breadth is due to the combination of Merton (1987)'s investor recognition 
                                                 
1 Breadth of institutional ownership is defined as the proportion of the universe of institutions holding a long 
position in a particular stock. 
2 See Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006), Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), and Gibson, Safieddine, and Sonti 
(2004) for discussion on institutions’ sophistication. 
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effect and the autocorrelation in changes in breadth.  They document that after controlling for the 
future changes in institutional ownership, current changes in breadth is negatively related to 
future returns.  Finally, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) attribute this predictability to the potential 
impact that changes in breadth have on the short sale constraint on a stock.  However, they 
explicitly acknowledge the possibility that the information advantages of institutions can be the 
reason behind the observed results.  In this paper, I investigate this possibility, and try to 
distinguish the three different hypotheses.  Specifically, I simultaneously examine return of 
stocks and operating earnings growth of firms around the quarter of changes in breadth.   
There are advantages with the inclusion of earnings growth in my analysis.  In fact, 
neither the short-sale constraint explanation by Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) nor the investors-
recognition argument by Lehavy and Sloan (2005) implies that changes in institutional 
ownership should have any direct effect on the future operating performance of firms.  
Conversely, the information hypothesis argues that institutions enter stocks of firms with better 
future performance and exit stocks of firms with poor prospects.  Therefore, this hypothesis 
predicts a positive relation between changes in breadth and the firms’ future operating 
performance.  Thus, I expect that operating earnings growth can serve as an effective benchmark 
that helps me to distinguish information hypothesis from others.   
Moreover, the inclusion of earnings growth provides us with a better understanding of the 
complicated relation between institutional trading and future returns.  On one hand, institutions 
are believed to be sophisticated, which implies that their trading should be able to predict returns.  
On the other hand, institutions are documented to herd their own trades and the trades of others 
(see Sias, 2004, and Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995), and the price pressure from herding 
can also result in return predictability.  For example, if an institution enters (exits) a stock, others 
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may follow to buy (sell) and thus push the stock price up (down) in the way predicted by the 
initial trade.  Therefore, the causality question of whether expected returns make institutions 
trade or institutional trading moves prices can hardly be distinguished if I use stock returns alone.  
Unlike stock returns, earnings are not affected by trading activities and therefore they can be 
used to resolve the above causality problem.  Specifically, if future earnings are found to be 
positively associated with changes in breadth, it will be evident that changes in breadth contain 
information.  Moreover, as earnings are a fundamental source for returns, if both returns and 
future earnings show positive relations with changes in breadth, I am in a better position to argue 
that the return predictability is caused by information. 
My findings support the information hypothesis.  I document that changes in breadth, 
when applied to the universe of institutions, preserves its return predictive power, which is 
consistent with the findings of mutual funds in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002).  In the four 
quarters following the changes in breadth, on average, stocks in the highest decile of changes in 
breadth outperform the size/book-to-market/momentum benchmark portfolios by 2.38%, while 
those in the lowest decile underperform their benchmarks by 2.44%, leaving a difference of 
4.82%.  When the sample is partitioned based on market capitalization, the difference in returns 
is more pronounced for small and medium firms than for large firms.   
I find evidence for the argument that institutions trade on information about future 
operating performance.  Specifically, during the year of changes in breadth and the year after, 
stocks in the highest decile of changes in breadth outperform those in the lowest decile in terms 
of operating earnings growth by 1.48% and 1.97%, respectively.  Moreover, in these two years, 
stocks in the top decile outperform their benchmark portfolios by 0.13% and 0.35%, while those 
in the bottom decile underperform their peers by 0.09% and 0.69%.  Also, similar to the 
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difference in returns, the difference in earnings growth between the two extreme deciles is 
systematically larger for small and medium size stocks than for large stocks. 
I document that changes in breadth lose their predictive power once I control for the 
future earnings growth of firms in regression analysis.  This result confirms the information 
argument that institutions can predict returns because they trade on information about future 
operating performance of firms.  Thus, in the presence of the original source of information, the 
forecast value of changes in breadth is absorbed.   
Next, I attempt to distinguish the two hypotheses by relying on the difference in the 
implication about variation in the ability of different institutions to predict returns.  In Chen, 
Hong, and Stein’s (2002) model, mutual funds are identical in terms of the short sale constraints 
they face.  Therefore, there should be no difference in the predictive power of different types of 
institutions.  If I allow for the possibility that mutual funds/institutions may face different 
degrees of short sale constraints, the model should predict that changes in the breadth of the 
institutions that are more likely to be short sale-constrained should be better able to predict 
returns.  The information explanation, which allows for differential ability among institutions, 
predicts instead that the institutions that are more likely to be skilled should be better able to 
predict returns.   
I first classify institutions based on their portfolio turnover ratios.  Almazan, Brown, 
Carlson, and Chapman (2004) document that about one-third of mutual funds are allowed to take 
short positions.  They also find that funds with higher turnover ratios are less likely to be 
constrained.  The short sale constraint hypothesis should therefore predict that changes in breadth 
of institutions with high turnover ratios should have less ability to predict returns.  On the other 
hand, the information hypothesis predicts that changes in breadth of high-turnover institutions, 
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whose managers are supposed to be better informed (Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers, 2000, and 
Yan and Zhang, 2006), should have better predictive power.  
Consistent with the information hypothesis, I find that changes in breadth of high-
turnover institutions have greater predictive power over returns.  In contrast, changes in breadth 
of low-turnover institutions exhibit no ability to predict returns.  More importantly, when I 
examine how current changes in breadth are related to past and future abnormal earnings growth, 
I find that lower-turnover institutions appear to herd on past and contemporaneous growth, while 
high-turnover institutions seem to be more concerned about future information, lending 
additional support for the information hypothesis. 
I then examine the relative predictive power of five types of institutions as classified by 
Thompson Financial.  This examination is motivated by the fact that changes in breadth of 
ownership could also be related to the number of shares available in the lending market.  
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) document that short sale constraints depend not only on the 
demand to sell stocks short, but also on the supply of lendable shares.  They suggest that the 
return predictability documented by Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) could also result from 
institutions being willing suppliers in the short sale market.  Nagel (2005) suggests that passive 
institutions such as insurance companies, pension funds, and bank trusts, which tend to have 
large and long-duration holdings, are the most active lenders and hence their ownership should 
have a more important impact on the constraints binding a stock.  I argue that if short sale 
constraints are the underlying factor behind return predictability via the effect of changes in 
breadth on lendable shares, declines (increases) in the breadth of passive institutions will force 
short sale constraints to bind more (less) tightly, and therefore the return predictability for such 
institutions should be more pronounced than that for active institutions such as investment 
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companies and investment advisors.  The information hypothesis, in contrast, suggests that 
changes in breadth of investment companies and investment advisors who are supposed to 
possess better stock-picking skills (Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005, Bennett, Sias, and 
Starks, 2003, and Del Guercio, 1996) should exhibit stronger predictive power.  Consistent with 
the information hypothesis, I find that the positive relation between changes in breadth and stock 
returns is significant only for investment companies and investment advisors.  In the four 
quarters following the changes, portfolios with the largest increases in breadth significantly 
outperform those with the largest reductions by 3.65% for this group of institutions.  
   My study extends the current literature on institutional investors in several ways.  Most 
importantly, the paper presents an answer to the debate over the reason behind the return 
predictability by changes in institutional ownership.  My results are most consistent with the 
information hypothesis, that is, these changes can predict returns because institutions trade on 
information about the future performance of firms.  In terms of the difference in performance 
among institutions, my paper adds evidence to confirm that institutions are not the same in their 
ability to predict returns.  In fact, trading by active institutions appears to contain more 
information about future stock returns and about the firms’ future operating performance than 
trading by passive entities.  Finally, with respect to the debate over the impact of institutions on 
market efficiency, my paper supports the argument that institutions enhance the efficiency by 
trading on information.   
The balance of this study is organized as follows.  In section 2.2, I review the literature 
on the relation between changes in institutional ownership and stock returns, and discuss 
different hypotheses on the return predictability by changes in breadth.  In section 2.3, I describe 
the data sources and the methodology.  Section 2.4 documents abnormal performance after 
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changes in breadth of ownership.  Section 2.5 reports the regression results on return 
predictability and earnings growth information. Section 2.6 documents variation in performance 
predictability by changes in breadth across different types of institutions.  Concluding remarks 
are presented in Section 2.7.      
2.2. Literature Review on Institutional Investors 
Institutions are long believed to be more sophisticated than individual investors.  While 
the evidence for this can be found in different areas of research, such as the advantage of 
institutions in gathering and processing information (Lev, 1988, Kim and Verrecchia, 1994) or 
the performance of institutions around firm specific events (Gibson, Safieddine, and Sonti, 2004, 
Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho, 2002), I focus my review on the relation between general 
trading by institutions and stock returns. 
2.2.1. Institutional trading and the contemporaneous returns 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) investigate the cross-sectional relation between aggregate 
trading by institutions and stock returns and find a positive relation between changes in holding 
and returns over the 12-month window.  They attribute this relation to institutional herding.  
Further analysis demonstrates that this relation is not irrationally caused by intra-period herding 
pressure since there is no evidence of return reversals in the two years following the year of 
changes in institutional holdings.  Moreover, stocks that institutions purchase subsequently 
outperform those they sell, and the difference in returns between these stocks is not fully 
explained by the momentum strategies.  Specifically, even for the extreme past winners (losers), 
future returns are negative (positive) when they are sold (purchased) by institutions.  Examining 
daily data, they document the same contemporaneous relation between daily trades and the same 
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day returns.  They conclude that ‘the result is consistent with the hypothesis that institutional 
investors, at the margin, are better informed than other investors’.  Sias (2004) further examines 
the rational herding behavior of institutional investors and shows that demand by institutions in a 
given quarter can be decomposed into portions caused by either herding in their past trades or 
herding in others’ trades.  Moreover, as trading by institutions is strongly correlated with 
contemporaneous returns and as future returns do not show any reversal, he suggests that 
institutions follow information revealed from each others’ trades and that herding is primarily 
related to the way information diffuses.  In other words, the positive relation between trading by 
institutions and contemporaneous returns originates from the information contained in their 
activities.  In an attempt to clarify the source of this contemporaneous relation, Sias, Starks, and 
Titman (2006) decompose the quarterly correlation between returns and institutional trading into 
correlations in higher frequency such as monthly or weekly.  They find that the positive relation 
observed in quarterly intervals arises from the positive contemporaneous relations in monthly 
and even weekly windows, suggesting that the direct effect of institutional trading is the main 
factor underlying the contemporaneous relation observed in the quarterly and annually windows.  
When using changes in number of institutions and changes in aggregate institutional holdings to 
proxy for information strength and price pressure, respectively, they find that the price impact of 
institutional trading has both temporary and permanent components.  Moreover, because the 
contemporaneous returns are more strongly related to changes in the number of institutions, they 
conclude that information plays a central role in generating the widely-documented positive, 
contemporaneous relation.   
The contemporaneous relation is also found in daily and intra-day trading.  Examining 
NASDAQ 100 stocks from May 1, 2000 to February 28, 2001, Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu 
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(2003) document that the contemporaneous relation persists in daily level and that institutional 
trading follows past returns.  However, they find little evidence of price reversal, suggesting that 
information is the reason behind the documented relation.  Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (1995) 
examine trades executed by 37 large investment firms from July 1986 to December 1988.  They 
find that institutions normally split their trade package into multi-day trades and that market 
impact and trading costs are associated with multi-factors, including firm size, relative package 
size, and the management firm itself.  The contemporaneous price impacts are significant and 
different between buy and sell packages.  On average, price reactions are stronger for buy 
packages than for sell packages.  The overall evidence on the contemporaneous relation between 
the stock returns and changes in institution ownership is consistent with the information effect 
associated with institutions trading.   
2.2.2. Changes in institutional ownership and future returns 
While there is agreement that changes in institutional ownership can predict returns, there 
is no consensus on the reason behind this relation.  There are three hypotheses proposed to 
explain this return predictability.   
The information hypothesis states that changes in institutional ownership in general, and 
changes in institutional breadth in particular, can predict returns because institutions possess 
information advantage and trade on information about the fundamental value of firms.  Wermers 
(1999) examines the herding behavior of mutual funds and find that funds are equally likely to 
herd when they buy and sell stocks and that funds are not homogeneous in their herding practice.  
More importantly, when analyzing the impact of trading by funds on long-term stock returns, he 
shows that stocks that mutual funds purchase significantly outperform those they sell in the 
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quarter of trade and in the subsequent quarters, although this effect is concentrated in small-cap 
stocks.  He argues that institutions are rational in their herd and that their trading contains 
information and helps to accelerate the price adjustment process.  Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers 
(2000) examine the value of active mutual fund managers by evaluating the performance of 
stocks they hold and the performance of those they trade.  They find that stocks that mutual 
funds actively buy significantly outperform those they actively sell over the quarter of trade and 
over the following four quarters.  This result prevails for large as well as for small stocks, and for 
value as well as for growth stocks.  Further analysis shows that growth-oriented and high-
turnover funds possess better stock picking skills than income-oriented and low-turnover funds.  
The findings justify the value of actively money managers and support the hypothesis that they 
possess better stock picking ability. 
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) develop and test a model for return predictability based on 
the Miller (1977) theory of short-sale constraint.  Miller (1977) argues that when short sale 
constraint binds, only the optimists can register their belief in prices.  As a result, prices are 
biased upward and returns are expected to decline in the future.  Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) 
use changes in breadth of mutual funds to proxy for short-sale constraint and find that this proxy 
can forecast returns for up to 12 months.  Specifically, stocks that experience the largest 
increases (reductions) in breadth outperform (underperform) their benchmark portfolios by 2.3% 
(2.6%) in the following four quarters.  They argue that the return predictability originates from 
the price impact of the short sale constraint on a stock, which is measure by the breadth of 
ownership.  However, they explicitly acknowledge the possibility that the observed results can 
emerge from the stock-picking skills of the mutual funds.   
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The third hypothesis about return predictability is based on Merton (1987)’s model of 
capital market equilibrium under incomplete information.  Merton (1987) assumes that market 
participants only invest in the securities that they know about and thus the variation in ‘investor 
recognition’ affects stock returns.  Lehavy and Sloan (2005) use changes in institutional breadth 
to the proxy for investor recognition in order to test Merton (1987)’s predictions.  They find that, 
consistent with Merton (1987), contemporaneous return is positively related to changes in 
breadth.  Also, similar to Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), they document a positive relation 
between changes in ownership in a given quarter and stock returns in the next 12 months.  In the 
regression analysis, they show that after controlling for future trading activities of institutions, 
current changes in breadth are negatively related to future returns.  Lehavy and Sloan (2005) 
argue that the return predictability by changes in institutional breadth can be attributed to the 
combination of the autocorrelation in changes in institutional breadth and the investor 
recognition effect of Merton (1987). 
2.3. Data and Summary Statistics 
2.3.1. Data 
I obtain institutional ownership information from Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum 
13-F database.  I start my institutional ownership in 1982 because data from Thompson Financial 
CDA/Spectrum 13-F is not completed prior to this.3 The requirement of operating performance 
for two years after the changes in ownership stops my sample through the end of 2002. 
                                                 
3 Four out of eight quarters in the year 1980 and 1981 do not have sufficient variation in changes in breadth within 
each size quintiles.  For example, in the first quarter of 1980, the smallest two size quintiles have almost no changes 
in breadth of institution. 
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I measure the breadth of ownership at the end of each quarter t (BREADTHt), following 
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), as the ratio of the number of institutions holding a stock to the 
total number of institutions at the end of the prior quarter (t–1).  Because the universe of 
institutions increases drastically over time, only institutions that appear in both quarter (t–1) and 
quarter (t) are counted when computing BREADTHt.  This technique helps to capture the trading 
activities of existing institutions by excluding the impact of changes in composition of the 
universe.  My analysis focuses on the changes in breadth of ownership from quarter t–1 to 
quarter t (∆BREADTHt).  This variable is expected to be associated with information about the 
future of firm.   
I follow Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) and construct portfolios of changes in breadth 
conditional on capitalization.  Specifically each quarter, I assign stocks into market-value-
quintiles using NYSE cutoff values.  Within each size quintile, stocks are assigned into deciles 
based on ∆BREADTHt.  Finally, stocks in the same deciles of ∆BREADTHt are combined across 
size quintiles to yield ten portfolios (P1 to P10).  This process is necessary because ∆BREADTHt 
and firm size are strongly correlated.  Thus, if I formed portfolios unconditional on 
∆BREADTHt, large (small) firms will dominate the high (low) ∆BREADTHt portfolio and as a 
result, my tests cannot distinguish between size effect and changes in breadth effect.   
I also compute the fractional holding by institutions for a stock, denoted HOLDt, as the 
total number of shares held by all institutions at the end of a quarter (t) divided by the total share 
outstanding at that time.  To control for the rising trend in the universe of institutions, the 
variable HOLDt includes only institutions that stay in the sample both in quarter t–1 and t.  The 
changes in HOLDt from one quarter to the next, denoted ∆HOLDt, represent the aggregate 
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buying or selling activity by all institutions, free from the changes in composition of the 
universe. 
I examine performance for each of the ten portfolios formed above (P1 to P10) both in 
terms of stock returns and the underlying firms’ operating earnings growth.  I use data from the 
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stock file to calculate the buy-and-
hold returns for one, two, three, and four quarters after the changes in breadth.  I obtain all 
financial data from the COMPUSTAT Quarterly file.  I measure book to market ratio (BTM) 
following Fama and French (1993).  Book value is defined as the value of common equity, plus 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit, and minus the book value of preferred stocks.  BTM for 
a given quarter (BTMt) equals the book value for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 
divided by market value of equity at the end of year t-1.  To evaluate the abnormal performance 
of stocks, I use characteristics-based benchmark method developed by Daniel et al.  (1997).  
Specifically, stocks are assigned into market-cap quintiles using NYSE cutoff values every 
quarter.  Within each size quintile, stocks are further sorted into quintiles based on book-to-
market ratio (BTM), also using NYSE cutoff values, resulting in 25 portfolios.  For each of the 
25 size/book-to-market portfolios, stocks are finally sorted into momentum quintiles based on 
the previous 12-month return, yielding 125 characteristics-based benchmark portfolios.  The 
return for each portfolio is the equally weighted average of the returns for all stocks in that 
portfolio.  To reduce survivorship bias, if a stock is delisted during the evaluation period, I use 
CRSP-equally-weighted return to replace the return of that stock in calculating the benchmark 
average.  The raw return of a given stock is then subtracted by the return of the benchmark 
portfolio to which that stock belongs to obtain abnormal return.  For robustness purposes, I use 
the 25 size/book-to-market portfolios as benchmarks in some of the tests. 
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I use CRSP monthly file to calculate share turnover by dividing the trading volume by 
shares outstanding at the end of each month.  I sum turnovers over every three months to obtain 
quarterly turnover, denoted as TURNOVERt.  Following Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), I 
subtract the mean value of turnover for either NASDAQ firms or NYSE/AMEX firms from 
individual turnover data to make turnover comparable for NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX stocks, 
resulting in exchange-adjusted turnover, named as XTURNOVERt. 
2.3.2. Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on the variables used in my analysis.  Panel A reports 
the mean, median, and standard deviation values for each variable by size quintiles.  All 
measures of institutional ownership and changes in ownership are strongly correlated with 
market capitalization, which justifies my process of forming ∆BREADTHt portfolios conditional 
on size.  For the smallest stocks, less than 1% of institutions hold a long position compared with 
more than 20% for the largest ones.  Institutions own about 15% of total shares outstanding in 
the small cap compare with more than 50% in the large cap.  Changes in breadth (∆BREADTHt) 
and changes in fractional holding (∆HOLDt) are positive across size quintiles.  Also, standard 
deviation of both BREADTHt and ∆BREADTHt increases in market capitalization.  The standard 
deviation of ∆BREADTHt for the smallest stocks is only 15 percent the number for the largest 
stocks.  Apart from the smallest stocks, all other size quintiles have similar average momentum 
factor, which suggests that momentum does not strongly depend on firm size.  Finally and not 
surprisingly, turnover appears to be a function of size.   
In panel B and C, I report the average of quarterly-values for HOLDt and ∆HOLDt, and 
BREADTHt and ∆BREADTHt every two years from 1982 to 2002, respectively.  HOLDt more 
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than doubled during 1982-2002 period, from 18.36% in 1982 to 38.19% in 2002.  The increase is 
more pronounced for the small and medium size quintiles, suggesting the increasing interest of 
institutions toward smaller capitalization stocks.  This is consistent with Bennett, Sias, and Starks 
(2003) who find that institutions have migrated toward small stocks to exploit their information 
advantage.  In panel C, the level of BREADTHt for the whole sample appears to be time 
independent.  However, it stays fairly stable for small stocks but falls for large stocks.  For the 
entire sample, average BREADTHt is about 4%-5% of the universe of institutions.  That number 
for the smallest size quintile is less than 1% and for the largest quintiles is more than 20%.  
Average ∆BREADTHt is positive in most cases, which suggests the expansion in the portfolio of 
institutions over time.  Also, ∆BREADTHt is more volatile for small and medium stocks than for 
the two large size quintiles.  For example, the variation in ∆BREADTHt for the smallest quintile 
is 0.19%, which is less than half the variation for the next quintile, and about one-seventh the 
variation for the largest quintile.  Such limited variation in the smallest quintile could be an 
obstacle in detecting a relation between changes in breadth and future returns.  Therefore, I 
follow the approach in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) and Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) and 
include only stocks with market capitalization above the 20 percentile NYSE breakpoint in my 
analysis. 
2.4. Return Predictability and the Information Content 
 of Changes in Breadth 
2.4.1. Abnormal performance following changes in breadth 
Table 2 reports the relation between changes in breadth (∆BREADTHt) and future stock 
returns.  Panel A examines the raw returns for those portfolios.  It shows that returns increase 
monotonically with changes in breadth.  For 4-quarter window, return for portfolio 1 (P1), with 
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the lowest ∆BREADTHt, is 12.36%, while return for portfolio 10 (P10), with the largest 
∆BREADTHt, is 18.47%.  The differences in raw returns for the two extreme portfolios (P10–
P1) are significant for up to 3 quarters following the formation date.  The magnitude of the 
difference is economically significant; 6.88% and 6.11% for 3-quarter and 4-quarter windows, 
respectively. 
Panel B reports the characteristic-based abnormal returns.4  Similar to the raw returns, the 
abnormal returns appear to have a positive relation with ∆BREADTHt.  Further, the abnormal 
returns for extreme portfolios (P1 and P10) are significant across all holding periods, suggesting 
that changes in ownership predict returns both when there are increases or declines in breadth.  
The return differences (P10-P1) are economically large, at 4.98% for the three-quarter holding 
period and 4.82% for the four-quarter holding period, and statistically significant. 
Next, I partition the sample based on market capitalization and reexamine the relation 
between changes in breadth and returns to see how this relation varies across size quintiles.  In 
Table 3, I report returns of the two extreme portfolios (P1 and P10) and their differences by size 
quintiles.  Panels A, and B report raw returns, abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-
market/momentum benchmarks, respectively.5  As results from the two panels are comparable, 
for brevity, I focus on Panel C.  Across size quintiles and time windows, portfolios with the 
largest reductions in breadth (P1) underperform while those with the largest increases in breadth 
(P10) outperform their benchmark portfolios.  As a result, the differences between P10 and P1 
are larger for small and medium quintile than for the largest quintiles.  For 4-quarter window, the 
differences in returns for small and medium sizes stocks are 4.23%, 6.77%, 5.25%, and those 
                                                 
4 I report the abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-market benchmark in Appendix 
5 I report the abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-market benchmark by size quintiles in Appendix  
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numbers for the largest two quintiles are 2.21% and 3.50%.  The conclusions obtained above are 
also applicable to the panel B which reports abnormal returns adjusted for size/book to market 
benchmarks.   
In terms of raw return, which is reported in panel A, portfolios with the largest reductions 
in breadth (P1) underperform portfolios with the largest increases (P10).  For example, the 4-
quarter returns for P1 and P10 for the smallest quintile are 11.68% and 19.97%, respectively.  
The numbers for the largest quintile are 13.81% and 18.14%, respectively.  Also, across 
windows examined, the differences in returns between P10 and P1 are larger for small and 
medium size portfolios than for the two largest size portfolios, suggesting that return 
predictability is more pronounced for small and medium stocks.   
The above findings on the relation between returns and changes in breadth are not only 
consistent with short sale constraint model by Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) but also consistent 
with information hypothesis.  According to information hypothesis, this positive relation is 
expected as institutions enter stocks with better future and exit those with poor prospect.  Also, 
from information angle, this effect is expected to be stronger for small and medium size stocks, 
which suffer from severe information asymmetry.  In order to investigate whether information is 
the reason for the return predictability, I first look at the relation between changes in breadth and 
operating earnings growth of firms around the quarter of changes in breadth.  Next, I examine 
whether the predictive power of changes in breadth persists after controlling for information 
about the future earnings growth of firms.  Then, I examine how the predictive power varies 
among different types of institutions.  Finally, for robustness purpose, I examine the predictive 
power of the two components of changes in breadth, namely the proportions of institutions that 
enter and exit a give stocks. 
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2.4.2. Changes in breadth and future operating earnings growth 
In this section, I examine the relation between changes in breadth of ownership and the 
future operating earnings performance of firms.  Because earnings are a fundamental source for 
stock returns, I expect that if institutions trade on information about firm values, their trading 
should be associated with the future earnings.  The short sale constraint and investor recognition 
do not anticipate such a relation.   
Barber and Lyon (1996) find that tests using changes in the firm’s operating performance 
yield more powerful test statistics than those based on the level of the performance.  Therefore, I 
use the earnings growth instead of earnings level.  I follow Asquith, Healy, and Palepu (1989) in 
forming an earnings growth measure.  Annual earnings are defined as the sum of earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operation (DATA 25 in the COMPUSTAT Quarterly 
dataset) over the four quarters.  The calculation of earnings is shown in the Figure 2.1, in which 
year 0 includes quarter 0, the quarter of changes in institutional ownership, and the three quarters 
before. 
Earnings growth in a given year t (EGt) is the change in earnings from year t-1 to year t, 
scaled by the market capitalization at the end of quarter 0.  Specifically, earnings growth for year 
t is calculated as: 
ValueMarket0Quarter
EarningEarningEG 1ttt −
−=        (2.1) 
According to the time schedule above, the earnings following year 0 are measured strictly 
after the quarter of changes in breadth.  Therefore any relation between the changes in breadth 
and future earnings growth can be interpreted as a result of the information institutions possess 
when they trade.   
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Table 4 reports the relation between earnings growth and changes in breadth over the five 
years around year 0.  Panel A exhibits an interesting pattern of raw earnings growth for ten 
portfolios (P1 to P10).  Before changes in breadth occur, P10 underperforms P1 by 0.35% and 
0.30%, for year -2 and year -1, respectively.  However, in the year of changes and the year after, 
earnings growth monotonically increases in ∆BREADTHt.  In year 0, earnings growth for 
portfolio with the largest reductions in breadth (P1) is -0.19% while the growth for portfolio at 
the other extreme (P10) is 1.29%, creating a difference of 1.48%.  The difference widens in the 
following year (year 1) to reach 1.97%.  All numbers are statistically significant.  Also, there is 
no sign of reversal in the year after.   
For abnormal earnings growth, to be consistent with the method of calculating abnormal 
returns, I adjust earnings growth of the individual stock for the median growth of the size/book-
to-market/momentum benchmark portfolio to which the firm belongs.6  The relation between 
changes in breadth and abnormal growth is presented in panel B.  Before the year of changes, P1 
outperforms while P10 slightly underperforms their benchmark portfolios, generating the 
negative and significant difference in abnormal growth between P10 and P1.  However, in year 0 
and year 1, abnormal growth appears to increase with changes in breadth; especially in year 1, 
the relation becomes monotonic.  In year 0 and year 1, P1 underperforms its peers by 0.09% and 
0.69%, respectively.  At the same time, P10 outperforms its benchmarks by 0.13% and 0.35%.  
The differences between the two extreme portfolios (P10–P1) are significant.  In year 2, P10 still 
exhibits better performance than P1 but the difference is no longer significant. 
                                                 
6 Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest that tests based on earnings growth adjusted for the industry level are powerful 
and well specified.  In a robustness check not tabulated here, I analyze the abnormal earnings growth adjusted for 
the median value of the industry, which is classified according to Fama and Frech (1997).  The results obtained are 
consistent with those presented in panel B of table 4.   
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Table 5 reports the relation between earnings growth and changes in breadth by size 
quintiles.  The purpose of this table is to examine whether the variation in the information 
environment has any impact on the information content of changes in breadth.  Panel A examines 
raw earnings growth differences between extreme portfolios (P10–P1).  Before year 0, earnings 
growths of both portfolios are positive and significant (except for small size firms).  Moreover, 
P10 appears to underperform P1.  However, in the year of changes in breadth and the year after, 
the differences P10–P1 are positive and significant.  For the largest size firms, the difference is 
1.18% in year 0 and 1.54% in year 1.  For the smallest size category, the numbers are 2.43% and 
2.47%.  Panel B examines abnormal earnings growth adjusted for the benchmark level.  Similar 
to the raw data, before the quarter of changes in breadth, abnormal growth for P10 is lower than 
that for P1, in most cases.  Moreover, P10 appears to underperform the benchmark in pre-change 
windows.  However, in year 0 and the year after, portfolios with the highest increases in breadth 
(P10) significantly outperform their benchmark by 0.29% and 0.56% for the smallest size 
quintiles and by 0.12% and 0.23% for the largest quintile.  At the same time, portfolios with the 
largest reductions in breadth (P1) underperform their benchmark by 0.05% and 1.18% for the 
smallest size and by 0.23% and 0.51% for the largest size quintile.  Not surprisingly, the 
differences in abnormal earnings growth for the two extreme portfolios are all positive and 
significant in year 0 and year 1.  Also, there is no significant difference between the two 
portfolios in year 2.  The above findings are consistent with the notion that across size quintiles, 
institutions trade on information about firms.  They exit stocks with poor future earnings while 
enter those with better prospects.   
The pattern of earnings growth observed in this table is similar to the pattern of returns 
reported in Table 3.  In fact, stocks with the largest reductions (increases) in breadth experience 
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both negative (positive) abnormal returns and negative/positive abnormal earnings growth.  
Moreover, the differences in raw as well as abnormal earnings growth and returns are larger for 
small and medium stocks than for large stocks.  This is consistent with the information argument 
that changes in breadth are more informative when the information asymmetry is more severe.   
The results with earnings and returns suggest that institutions trade on information about 
the future growth of firms and their trades help to disseminate information to the market.  When 
the information is finally revealed, the market reacts accordingly and moves stock prices in the 
direction predicted by institutions’ trades. 
2.5. Regression Analysis 
In this section I use regression analysis to formally test the conclusions obtained above.  
First, I show that consistent with univariate results, changes in breadth (∆BREADTHt) can be 
used to forecast future returns under regression framework.  Second, I extend the literature on 
institutional investors by investigating whether this return predictability emerges from the fact 
that institutions trade on information about operating performance. 
2.5.1. Return predictability and changes in breadth 
I use ∆BREADTHt to predict future returns through Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions.  
Each quarter, I estimate a cross-sectional regression of 12-month abnormal return on changes in 
breadth and control variables for the whole sample.  As my sample spans 21 years from Jan 1982 
to Dec 2002, I have 84 quarters, and therefore 83 regressions for each specification.  Thus, for a 
given explanatory variable, I have 83 coefficient estimates.  The average and the standard error 
for the average are calculated from the time series of 83 estimates and corrected for serial 
correlation using Newey West method (with 4 lags).   
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Table 6 reports the results from these regressions.  The most important finding is that 
∆BREADTHt appears to be the only factor that explains the variation in future returns.  In the 
first specification, 12-month abnormal returns are regressed only on ∆BREADTHt.  The 
coefficient of 1.73 on ∆BREADTHt implies that a two-standard deviation difference in 
∆BREADTHt (0.79×2) generates a difference of 2.73% in 12-month abnormal returns.  In the 
second column, the model includes changes in fractional holding (∆HOLDt).  The results show 
that changes in holding by institutions at quarter 0 do not have any predictive power over returns.  
In the third column, I control for firm characteristics at the end of quarter 0.  These 
characteristics, including size, book-to-market, momentum, and exchange-adjusted turnover,  
appear unable to predict abnormal returns for the whole sample as the absolute value of the t-
statistics for individual characteristics is no more than 1.30.  The predictive power of 
∆BREADTHt seems to be unaffected by the inclusion of new factors.  Again, the coefficient of 
1.95 in the last specification suggests that a spread of two standard deviations in ∆BREADTHt 
predicts a difference of 3.08% in abnormal returns.  In short, Table 6 shows that ∆BREADTHt 
can reliably predict abnormal performances of stocks while other firm characteristics fail to do 
so. 
2.5.2. Return predictability and information on earnings growth 
In section 4.2, I document that changes in breadth are positively correlated with both 
future returns and future operating performances.  This finding suggests that return predictability 
may come from the information that institutions possess at the time they trade.  In this section, I 
use regression analysis to formally test this prediction.  I use the same method as in Table 6 and 
add earnings growth variables to examine how the return predictability by changes in breadth 
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varies when past and future information about earnings are controlled for.  The results are 
reported in Table 7. 
It is possible that institutions simply trade on past operating performances or herd on 
public information.  To investigate this possibility, I first examine whether return predictability 
by changes in breadth survives when past and contemporaneous earnings growths are controlled.  
The regression results are reported in the first two models in Table 7.  The coefficients on past 
earnings growth (year -1) and contemporaneous growth (year 0) are positive and significant, 
suggesting that past and contemporaneous performances has certain implications about future 
stock returns.  More importantly, changes in breadth still appear to be able to predict returns.  
When only changes in ownership and past and contemporaneous growth are used, the coefficient 
on ∆BREADTHt is 0.83, statistically significant.  When firm specific characteristics are 
controlled for, the coefficient is 0.96, again statistically significant.  The results suggest that 
information on past and contemporaneous operating performance does not subsume the 
information contained in changes in breadth. 
To examine whether return predictability remains after controlling for information about 
the future performance of firms, I include earnings growths for the two years following the 
changes in ownership (year +1 and +2) in my regression.  The results reported in the last two 
columns demonstrate that with the existence of future earnings information, changes in breadth 
lose their predictive power; the p-value for ∆BREADTHt rises to 74% in the last model.  The 
findings suggest that information on future growth of firms subsumes the information contained 
in changes in breadth.  The findings are consistent with the information hypothesis that changes 
in breadth can predict returns because institutions trade on information about future performance 
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of firms.  Therefore, once the original source of information is controlled for, changes in 
ownership do not exhibit the return predictability. 
2.6. Return Predictability for Different Types of Institutions 
2.6.1. Return predictability for institutions with different portfolio turnover ratios 
In Chen, Hong, and Stein’s (2002) model, the ability to predict future returns arises from 
the fact that mutual funds are constrained from taking short positions when they have 
unfavorable information.  In the model, mutual funds are assumed to be homogeneous in terms 
of the short sale constraints they face, and hence there should be no difference in return 
predictability among them.  If I relax this assumption and allow institutions to face different 
levels of constraints, Chen, Hong, and Stein’s (2002) model will predict that changes in breadth 
of those institutions that are more likely to be constrained should be better able to predict stock 
returns.  Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) find that mutual funds with higher 
turnover are less likely to be constrained.  The short sale constraint hypothesis should therefore 
predict that changes in the breadth of high-turnover institutions should have less ability to predict 
returns.  The turnover ratio also has implications about information.  Chen, Jegadeesh, and 
Wermers (2000) and Yan and Zhang (2006) find evidence that high-turnover institutions are 
better informed and have better stock-picking skills.  Therefore, if superior information is the 
source of return predictability, changes in breadth of high-turnover institutions should have 
better predictive power.  In this section, I empirically evaluate how return predictability varies 
with institutions’ trading frequency. 
I follow Yan and Zhang (2006) in calculating my measure of trading turnover (churn 
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where tikS ,, and 1,, −tikS are the numbers of shares of stock (i) held by institution k at the 
end of quarter t and quarter (t-1), respectively, and tiP , and 1, −tiP  are the prices of stock (i) at the 
end of quarter t and quarter (t-1), respectively.  tiP ,∆ is the change in price during quarter t.  Both 
shares and prices are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends.  The churn rate for each 
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Following Yan and Zhang (2006), I rank institutions into low-, medium-, and high-
turnover tertiles based on the average of past churn rates.  I then examine how changes in breadth 
of institutions in each tertile predict returns and operating performance.  The results are reported 
in Table 8.  Panel A shows that the predictability by changes in breadth increases in trading 
turnover.  For high-turnover institutions, the three-quarter and four-quarter abnormal returns 
increase almost monotonically in changes of breadth of ownership.  Abnormal returns for the 
extreme portfolios are statistically significant and economically large.  For medium-turnover 
 27
institutions, individual returns for extreme portfolios are not as significant as those for the high-
turnover panel.  As a result, the differences (P10-P1) for medium-turnover institutions are less 
than half those for high-turnover institutions.  Also, the significance of the differences is only at 
the 5% level compared with the 1% level for the high-turnover group.  When I move to low-
turnover institutions, there appears to be little relation between changes in breadth and future 
returns.  The differences (P10-P1) are economically small (even negative) and statistically 
insignificant.  Finally, I compare the differences in return predictability between the high- and 
low-turnover institutions and find that abnormal returns for the stocks in the low (high) changes 
in breadth deciles are significantly lower (higher) than those for the high-turnover institutions.  
As a result, the differences (P10-P1) are statistically significant.  These findings are consistent 
with the information hypothesis but appear to be at odds with the short sale hypothesis.  
Panel B reports the relation between abnormal earnings growth and changes in breadth 
for the three types of institutions.  I focus on the magnitude of abnormal earnings growth, and 
how earnings growth varies around the year of changes in breadth.  First, the information content 
about future earnings performance, as reflected in the earnings growth for year 1, increases in the 
trading frequency of institutions.  For the extreme portfolios, the magnitude of year 1 abnormal 
earnings growth increases from the low-turnover to the high-turnover groups.  As a result, the 
differences (P10-P1) in year 1 increase monotonically in trading turnover.  The difference for the 
high-turnover sample is 1.05%, compared with 0.45% and 0.21% for medium- and low-turnover 
institutions, respectively.7   
                                                 
7 Though not tabulated for brevity, I find that the difference of 0.75% in (P10-P1) between the high- and low-
turnover institutions is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 28
Second, the pattern of changes in abnormal earnings growth around year 0 exhibits a 
sharp difference among the three types of institutions.  For high-turnover institutions, before year 
1, there is no clear relation between changes in breadth and abnormal earnings growth; P10 even 
underperforms P1 in year -2 and year -1.  However, in year 1, earnings growth appears to 
increase monotonically in changes in breadth.  P1 underperforms its benchmark by 0.67% while 
P10 outperforms its benchmark by 0.38%, creating a significant difference of 1.05%.  In 
contrast, such a positive relation prevails even in year -1 and year 0 for medium- and low-
turnover panels.  In fact, stocks that experience decreases (increases) in breadth of ownership 
already underperform (outperform) the benchmark during these two years.  As a result, the 
differences in P10 and P1 are positive and significant in both year -1 and year 0.  The results 
from these two years suggest that medium- and low-turnover institutions herd to past and 
contemporaneous earnings information.  High-turnover institutions, on the other hand, appear to 
initiate and terminate positions based on their information about future earnings growth.   
In Panel C, I reexamine return predictability using regression analysis.  In the first model, 
for each type of institution I regress abnormal four-quarter returns on changes in breadth and 
controlled variables.  The coefficient on ∆BREADTHt measures the return predictability.  Model 
M1 does not include any variable related to earnings information.  I find that both the magnitude 
of coefficients on ∆BREADTHt and the level of significance increase in institutions’ turnover, 
consistent with the results reported in Panel A.  In fact, low-turnover institutions do not exhibit 
any predictive power.  When I include past and contemporaneous earnings growth as 
independent variables in the regression models (Model M2), the coefficient on ∆BREADTHt for 
high-turnover institutions becomes smaller and less significant, while that for the medium-term 
group becomes insignificant.  This is consistent with the conclusion from the univariate analysis 
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that medium-turnover institutions tend to herd to past and contemporaneous information.  
Finally, when I include variables related to future earnings growth (Model M3), the coefficient 
on ∆BREADTHt for the high-turnover institutions becomes insignificant, suggesting that the 
return-predictive power of ∆BREADTHt originates from information about firms’ future 
performance. 
2.6.2. Return predictability for institutions as classified by the Thomson Financial 
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) suggest that short sale constraints depend not only on 
the demand to sell short stocks but also on the supply of lendable stocks, and hence that Chen, 
Hong, and Stein’s (2002) return predictability could result from the role of institutions as a 
supplier in the lending market for shares.  According to Nagel (2005) and Duffie, Garleanu, and 
Pedersen (2002), passive institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds are the 
most active stock lenders, and hence their ownership should have more of an impact on the short 
sale constraints that bind a stock.  I reason that if short sale constraints are the source of return 
predictability via the effect of breadth on lendable shares, changes in breath of passive 
institutions will affect short sale constraints more and therefore should have a stronger effect on 
future returns than changes in breath of active institutions.  On the other hand, if information is 
the reason for the return predictability, then changes in breadth for investment companies and 
investment advisors who are supposed to have a better information advantage and better stock-
picking skills (Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005, Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003, and Del 
Guercio, 1996) should forecast future returns, while changes in breadth for passive institutions 
should not exhibit such ability. 
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Based on the classification by the Thomson Financial (TFN) 13F Holding data set, I 
partition the universe of institutions into (i) a passive group, which includes bank trusts and 
insurance companies, (ii) an active group, which includes investment companies and 
independent investment advisors, and (iii) all others, which include pension funds, foundations, 
university endowments, and ESOPs.  I examine return predictability for each category and report 
the results in Table 9.   
The reason I create passive and active groups is that there is significant variation in the 
size of the population of institutions across different types.  Over the period examined, on 
average there are 55 investment companies and 68 insurance companies, compared with 202 
bank trusts and 437 investment advisors.  Thus, if I examine each type of institution 
independently, the tests for small-population institutions cannot be as powerful as those for 
large-population institutions.  Also, for the purpose of testing the short sale constraint as well as 
information hypotheses, it should be more meaningful to examine institutions of similar nature 
together.  I focus my analysis on the relative return-predictive power between passive and active 
groups as the nature of the “All other” group is not conclusive. 
Panel A reports the relations between three-quarter and four-quarter abnormal returns and 
changes in breadth.  Consistent with the information hypothesis, the passive management group 
exhibits very weak predictive power as the extreme portfolios of changes in breadth do not 
experience significant performance, while returns appear to increase in changes in breadth for 
investment companies and investment advisors and the returns for the four extreme portfolios are 
highly significant.  As a result, differences in four-quarter returns (P10-P1) are economically 
large and statistically significant for the active group but not for the passive category.  The 
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differences (P10-P1) between the active institutions and passive institutions are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.   
To further investigate the information hypothesis, I examine the relation between 
abnormal earnings growth and changes in breadth in Panel B.  I observe a sharp difference in 
earnings growth around year 0 between the two groups of institutions.  Before year 0, the 
difference (P10-P1) is much larger and significant for active institutions, active institutions are 
not concerned about past earnings performance.  In year 0, the difference (P10-P1) for passive 
institutions is about two times the number for actives institutions.  In year 1, the absolute growth 
rates for the extreme portfolios are larger for active than for passive institutions.  The difference 
(P10-P1) for the former is about one and a half that for the latter: 0.78% for active institutions, 
significantly greater than 0.45% for the passive institutions.  Thus, even though all stocks that 
experience increases in breadth (for all types of institutions) perform well both in the year of 
changes in breadth and in the year after, changes in breadth of active institutions appear to 
contain more information about future firm performance.  This finding fits well with the relative 
return predictability across different institutions documented in Panel A.   
The results from these two panels are consistent with the information hypothesis, which 
allows different types of institutions to have differential ability to predict future returns.  In 
particular, active institutions exhibit stronger return predictability. 
In Panel C, I reexamine the return predictability using regression analysis.  Similar to my 
procedure in Panel C of Table 6, I regress four-quarter abnormal returns on changes in breadth, 
control variables, and information about abnormal earnings growth for each category of 
institution.  Again, the coefficient on ∆BREADTHt measures the return predictability.  The 
results from model M1 reconfirm the conclusion obtained in Panel A that only changes in 
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breadth of active institutions can predict returns; the t-statistics on ∆BREADTHt for investment 
companies and investment advisors are 3.10 compared with 1.68 for passive institutions.  In 
model M2, when I control for past and contemporaneous earnings information, changes in 
breadth for active institutions remain capable of forecasting returns, with a t-statistic of 2.61.  In 
the last model (M3), when I include future earnings growth in my regressions, the coefficient on 
changes of breadth of active institutions becomes statistically insignificant.  The findings in this 
panel support the information hypothesis’ conjecture that changes in breadth predict returns 
because certain types of institutions succeed in taking advantage of their superior information 
related to future earnings growth. 
2.7. Conclusions 
My paper examines why changes in breadth predict return.  Consistent with the existing 
literature, I document that changes in breadth measure, when applied to the universe of 
institutions, can predict returns in the following four quarters.  By including future earnings 
growth in my analysis, I first extend the literature by documenting that changes in institutional 
breadth can predict earnings growth in the first year after the changes in breadth, with no reversal 
in the second year.  Specifically, firms that experience the highest increases in breadth 
significantly outperform their benchmarks, while those experiencing the largest reductions in 
breadth significantly underperform their peers.  This finding supports the hypothesis that trading 
by institutions is related to information on the future operating performance of firms.  Second, I 
investigate how return predictability changes when I control for information about earnings 
growth.  I document that while changes in breadth can predict returns even after controlling for 
the past and contemporaneous earnings growth, they lose the predictive power when future 
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earnings growth is included in analysis.  This finding supports the information argument that 
changes in institutional breadth can predict returns because institutions trade on information 
about the future earnings of firms.  As a result, in the presence of the original source of 
information, changes in breadth are no longer able to forecast returns.  Third, when I partition the 
sample into different types of institutions, I document significant variation in the predictive 
power across institutions.  Specifically, only changes in breadth for active institutions, whose 
stock picking skill has been documented in the literature, are positively correlated with future 
returns while passive institutions such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds do not 
exhibit such power.  In general, the findings in this study support the information hypothesis that 
the documented return predictability can be attributed to the information contained in 
institutional entrances and exits. 
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2.8. Figure for Chapter Two 
Q-7 Q-6 Q-5 Q-4 Q-3 Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
YEAR -1 YEAR 0 YEAR 1 
Figure 2. 1. Schedule for calculating earnings growth  
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2.9. Tables for Chapter Two 
Table 2. 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics by Size Quintiles 
 Size Quintiles 























































































































































































































Panel B.  HOLDt (%) and ∆HOLDt (%) over Time 
Size quintile 






























































































































































Panel C.  BREADTHt (%) and ∆BREADTHt (%) over Time 
Size quintile 






























































































































































The sample includes stocks from the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1982 to 2002.  BREADTHt is the fraction 
of the universe of institutions that holds a given stock at the end of quarter t.  ∆BREADTHt is the changes in 
BREADTHt from quarter t–1 to quarter t.  HOLDt is the faction of total share outstanding held by institutions at the 
end of quarter t.  ∆HOLDt is the change in HOLDt from quarter t–1 to quarter t.  INt is the fraction of the universe of 
institution that enters a stock during quarter t.  OUTt is the fraction of the universe of institution that exits a stock 
during quarter t.  SIZEt is the market capitalization at the end of quarter t.  BTMt is the book-to-market ratio at the 
end of quarter t.  PRET12t is the raw return over 12-month period prior to the end of quarter t.  NASDAQ 
TURNOVERt is the equally average turnover for stocks listed on NASDAQ during quarter t.  NYSE/AMEX 
TURNOVERt the equally average turnover for stocks listed on either NYSE or AMEX during quarter t.  Panel A 
reports the mean, median, and standard deviation values of variables by size quintiles.  Panel B reports the mean 
values for quarterly fractional holding (HOLDt) and change in fractional holding (∆HOLDt) every two years, by size 
quintiles.  The first number is HOLDt, while the second is ∆HOLDt.  Panel C reports the mean values for quarterly 
breadth (BREADTHt) and quarterly changes in breadth (∆BREADTHt) every two years, by size quintiles.  The first 
number is BREADTHt, while the second is ∆BREADTHt.   
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Table 2. 2: Returns for Portfolios Formed on ∆BREADTHt 
 
Panel A.  Raw Returns 
∆BREADTHt Deciles 1-quarter 2-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 
1 2.73%** 5.55%** 8.70%*** 12.79%*** 
2 3.66%*** 7.22%*** 10.68%*** 14.79%*** 
3 3.79%*** 7.62%*** 11.40%*** 15.35%*** 
4 3.99%*** 8.19%*** 12.03%*** 16.42%*** 
5 3.78%*** 7.78%*** 11.72%*** 15.91%*** 
6 3.94%*** 8.15%*** 12.36%*** 16.49%*** 
7 4.18%*** 8.44%*** 12.52%*** 16.73%*** 
8 4.46%*** 8.30%*** 12.16%*** 16.00%*** 
9 4.97%*** 9.51%*** 13.77%*** 17.71%*** 
10 5.67%*** 10.30%*** 15.03%*** 18.42%*** 
P10–P1 2.94%*** 4.75%*** 6.33%*** 5.63%** 
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Panel B.  Abnormal Returns Adjusted for Size/Book-to-Market/Momentum 
∆BREADTHt Deciles 1-quarter 2-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 
1 -0.83%*** -1.61%*** -2.36%*** -2.44%*** 
2 -0.26% -0.64%* -1.02%** -1.22%*** 
3 -0.19% -0.36% -0.90% -1.37%** 
4 -0.06% -0.01% -0.26% -0.07% 
5 -0.26% -0.32% -0.51% -0.55% 
6 -0.29%* -0.30% -0.10% -0.07% 
7 -0.12% -0.28% -0.34% -0.32% 
8 0.08% -0.07% -0.24% -0.45% 
9 0.54%** 0.81%** 1.18%** 1.44%** 
10 0.98%** 1.52%* 2.62%** 2.38%* 
P10–P1 1.81%*** 3.13%*** 4.98%*** 4.82%*** 
 
At the end of each quarter, stocks are first sorted into quintiles on market capitalization.  Stocks within the same size 
quintile are then assigned into deciles of changes in breadth, ∆BREADTHt.  Next, stocks are recombined based on 
∆BREADTHt deciles across size quintiles to form ten portfolios.  Stocks with market capitalization below the 20th 
percentile using NYSE break points are excluded.  Stocks are bought and hold for the next four quarters.  For each 
quarter t, equally-weighted average returns are calculated for each portfolio.  The numbers reported in this table are 
the equally-weighted average of these time series.  The last row of each panel (P10-P1) reports the difference in 
mean returns between portfolio with the largest increases in ∆BREADTHt (P10) and portfolio with the largest 
decreases in ∆BREADTHt (P1).  Panel A reports the raw returns for each portfolio.  Panel B reports abnormal 
returns adjusted for size/book-to-market and size/book-to-market/momentum benchmarks.  The significance level is 
adjusted for serial correlation using a Newey-West estimator with a lag of up to four quarters.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 2. 3: Returns for Portfolios formed on ∆BREADTHt by Size Quintiles 
 
Panel A.  Raw Returns 
SIZEt quintiles ∆BREADTHt Deciles 2-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 
2 1 3.69%** 6.86%** 11.68%*** 
 10 11.43%*** 16.41%*** 19.97%*** 
 P10–P1 7.75%*** 9.55%*** 8.29%* 
3 1 4.35%** 7.39%*** 10.98%*** 
 10 9.76%*** 14.99%*** 17.84%*** 
 P10–P1 5.42%* 7.60%** 6.86%* 
4 1 5.83%*** 9.81%*** 14.18%*** 
 10 9.06%*** 13.68%*** 17.47%*** 
 P10–P1 3.22% 3.88% 3.29% 
5 1 6.28%*** 9.50%*** 13.81%*** 
 10 8.58%*** 13.93%*** 18.14%*** 
 P10–P1 2.30% 4.43% 4.33% 
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Panel B.  Abnormal Returns Adjusted for Size/Book-to-Market/Momentum 
SIZEt quintiles ∆BREADTHt Deciles 2-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 
2 1 -2.58%*** -3.77%*** -3.78%*** 
 10 2.49%*** 3.40%*** 2.99%** 
 P10–P1 5.07%*** 7.17%*** 6.77%*** 
3 1 -1.40%** -1.96%** -2.28%** 
 10 1.80%* 3.17%** 2.63% 
 P10–P1 3.20%*** 5.13%*** 4.91%** 
4 1 -0.59% -0.77% -0.55% 
 10 0.66% 1.34% 1.59% 
 P10–P1 1.25% 2.11% 2.14% 
5 1 -0.43% -1.04%* -0.96% 
 10 0.59% 1.57%* 1.57% 
 P10–P1 1.02% 2.61%** 2.53%** 
 
At the end of each quarter, stocks are first sorted into quintiles on market capitalization.  Stocks within the same size 
quintile are assigned into deciles of changes in breadth, ∆BREADTHt.  For each size quintile, stocks are recombined 
based on ∆BREADTHt deciles to form ten equally-weighted portfolios.  Stock returns and portfolio returns are 
calculated in the same manner as in table 2.  This table reports returns of the two extreme portfolios (P10 and P1) 
and the difference in returns between them (P10–P1) for each size quintile.  Panel A reports the mean value of raw 
returns.  Panel B reports the mean values of abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-market and size/book-to-
market/momentum benchmarks, respectively.  The significant level is adjusted for serial-correlation using a Newey-
West estimator with lag of four quarters.  ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. 
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Table 2. 4: Earnings Growth for Portfolios Formed on ∆BREADTHt 
 
Panel A.  Raw Earnings Growth (%) 
∆BREADTHt Deciles Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
1 0.86*** 0.92*** -0.19 -0.62*** 0.65*** 
2 0.71*** 0.76*** 0.28** 0.15 0.68*** 
3 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.49*** 0.43*** 0.31 
4 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.62*** 0.51*** 0.86*** 
5 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.71*** 
6 0.65*** 0.69*** 0.76*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 
7 0.61*** 0.68*** 0.85*** 0.78*** 0.71*** 
8 0.59*** 0.71*** 0.92*** 0.82*** 0.02 
9 0.60*** 0.68*** 1.07*** 1.03*** 0.73*** 
10 0.51*** 0.62*** 1.29*** 1.35*** 0.65*** 
P10–P1 -0.35*** -0.30*** 1.48*** 1.97*** 0.00 
 
Panel B. Abnormal Earnings Growth Adjusted for Size/Book-to-Market/ Momentum Benchmark  
∆BREADTHt Deciles Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
1 0.07*** 0.14*** -0.09*** -0.69*** -0.01 
2 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.22*** -0.05** 
3 0.00 0.00 -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.09 
4 0.01 -0.03** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.08 
5 0.00 -0.02*** -0.03*** 0.01 0.01 
6 0.01 -0.01* -0.02** 0.01 0.02 
7 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
8 0.00 0.01 0.03** 0.04** -0.23 
9 0.01 -0.01 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.03 
10 -0.01 -0.02* 0.13*** 0.35*** 0.03 
P10–P1 -0.08*** -0.16*** 0.22*** 1.05*** 0.04 
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At the end of each quarter, stocks are first sorted into quintiles on market capitalization.  Stocks within the same size 
quintile are assigned into deciles of changes in breadth, ∆BREADTHt.  Stocks are recombined based on 
∆BREADTHt deciles across size quintiles to form ten equally-weighted portfolios.  Stocks with market 
capitalization below 20th percentile using NYSE break point are excluded.  Earnings growths for each portfolio are 
tracked for the five years (20 quarters) around the formation quarter.  The time schedule is exhibited below where 
quarter 0 (Q0) is the portfolio formation quarter: 
Q-7 Q-6 Q-5 Q-4 Q-3 Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
YEAR -1 YEAR 0 YEAR 1 
Earnings growth in a given year (EGt) is the difference in earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operation between year (t) and the year before (t–1), scaled by market capitalization at the end of the portfolio 





For each quarter, median values of annual earnings growth are calculated for each ∆BREADTHt deciles.  Numbers 
reported in this table are the mean values of the time series of median growth for each portfolio.  The last row in 
each panel (P10–P1) reports the difference in earnings growths between portfolio with highest increase in 
∆BREADTHt (P10) and portfolio with largest reduction in ∆BREADTHt (P1).  Panel A reports raw earnings 
growth.  Panel B reports abnormal earnings growth adjusted for the median earnings growth of the size/book-to-
market/momentum benchmark portfolio.  The significant level is adjusted for serial-correlation using a Newey-West 
estimator with lag of four quarters.  ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. 
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Table 2. 5: Earning Growth for Portfolios formed on ∆BREADTHt by Size Quintiles 
 




Deciles Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
 1 0.84*** 0.93*** -0.78*** -1.07** 0.74** 
2 10 0.50*** 0.62*** 1.65*** 1.40*** 0.57*** 
 P10–P1 -0.34*** -0.31** 2.43*** 2.47*** -0.17 
 1 0.90*** 1.06*** -0.32** -1.07*** 0.72*** 
3 10 0.58*** 0.62*** 1.35*** 1.46*** 0.63*** 
 P10–P1 -0.32*** -0.44*** 1.67*** 2.53*** -0.09 
 1 0.89*** 0.95*** -0.05 -0.54** 0.68*** 
4 10 0.50*** 0.57*** 1.23*** 1.35*** 0.71*** 
 P10–P1 -0.39*** -0.38*** 1.28*** 1.89*** 0.03 
 1 0.80*** 0.71*** -0.11 -0.40** 0.61*** 
5 10 0.48*** 0.64*** 1.07*** 1.14*** 0.64*** 
 P10–P1 -0.32*** -0.07 1.18*** 1.54*** 0.03 
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Deciles Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
 1 0.08 0.24*** -0.05 -1.18*** 0.02 
2 10 -0.04 -0.10*** 0.29*** 0.56*** -0.09 
 P10–P1 -0.12 -0.34*** 0.34*** 1.74*** -0.11 
 1 0.06 0.23*** -0.15*** -1.03*** -0.13 
3 10 0.02 -0.06** 0.11*** 0.47*** -0.02 
 P10–P1 -0.04 -0.29*** 0.26*** 1.50*** 0.11 
 1 0.10*** 0.14*** -0.10 -0.56*** -0.04 
4 10 -0.04** -0.04 0.13*** 0.31*** 0.11* 
 P10–P1 -0.14** -0.18 0.23** 0.87*** 0.15 
 1 0.06* 0.04 -0.23*** -0.51*** -0.09 
5 10 -0.01 0.01 0.12*** 0.23*** 0.04 
 P10–P1 -0.07** -0.03 0.35*** 0.74*** 0.13 
 
At the end of each quarter, stocks are first sorted into quintiles on market capitalization.  Stocks within the same size 
quintile are assigned into deciles of changes in breadth, ∆BREADTHt.  For each size quintile, stocks are recombined 
based on ∆BREADTHt deciles to form ten equally-weighted portfolios.  Earnings growths of the portfolio are 
tracked for the five years (20 quarters) around the formation quarter.  Each quarter, median values of annual 
earnings growth are calculated for each ∆BREADTHt deciles.  This table reports the mean values of the time series 
of median earnings growth for the two extreme portfolios (P1 and P10) and the difference in growths between them 
(P10–P1) for each size quintile.  Panel A reports raw earnings growth.  Panel B reports abnormal earnings growth 
adjusted for the median earnings growth of the size/book-to-market/momentum benchmark portfolios.  The 
significant level is adjusted for serial-correlation using a Newey-West estimator with lag of four quarters.  ***, **, 




Table 2. 6: Predictive Power of ∆BREADTHt by Size  
 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 





LOGSIZEt   
0.53 
0.92 
BTMt   
-0.17 
-0.43 
PRET12t   
0.20 
0.38 















Adj.  Rsqr (%) 0.24 0.38 2.0 
 
This table reports the regression results of 12-month abnormal return adjusted for size/book-to-market/momentum 
benchmarks on changes in breadth (∆BREADTHt), changes in fractional holding (∆HOLDt) and firm specific, 
controlling variables.  LOGSIZEt is the natural log of market capitalization of a firm at the end of quarter t.  BTMt is 
the book-to-market ratio of a firm at the end of quarter t.  PRET12t is the raw return of a stock 12-month prior to the 
end of quarter t.  XTURNOVERt is the turnover of a stock adjusted for its exchange’s level at the end of quarter t.  
Every quarter, separate regressions are run for the whole sample.  I obtain a time series of estimates for each 
coefficient.  The first numbers reported on the table are the mean values of the time series of estimates, while the 
seconds are the t-statistic adjusted for serial-correlation with lag of four quarters.   
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Table 2. 7: Return Predictability and Operating Performance 
 
Model M1 M2 M3 M4 









































































R-sqr 1.21 2.41 11.55 12.95 
 
This table reports the regression results of 12-month abnormal return adjusted for size/book-to-market/momentum 
benchmarks on changes in breadth (∆BREADTHt), changes in fractional holding (∆HOLDt), firm specific, 
controlling variables, and past, contemporaneous and future abnormal earnings growth (Ab_EGi).  LOGSIZEt is the 
natural log of market capitalization of a firm at the end of quarter t.  BTMt is the book-to-market ratio of a firm at 
the end of quarter t.  PRET12t is the raw return of a stock 12-month prior to the end of quarter t.  XTURNOVERt is 
the turnover of a stock adjusted for its exchange’s level at the end of quarter t.  Every quarter, regressions are run for 
the whole sample.  With 84 quarters, I obtain a time series of estimates for each coefficient.  The first numbers 
reported on the table are the mean values of the time series of estimates, while the seconds are the t-statistic adjusted 
for serial correlation with a lag of four quarters. 
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Table 2. 8: Changes in Breadth of Institutions with Different Turnover Ratios 
 
Panel A.  Changes in Breadth and Future Returns 
 High-turnover Institutions Medium-turnover Institutions Low-turnover Institutions 
High-turnover 
 – Low-turnover 
∆BREADTHt 
Deciles 3-quarter 4-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 
1 -1.97*** -1.94*** -0.80** -0.82** 0.05 -0.03 -2.02*** -1.91*** 
2 -0.86** -1.01*** -0.63* -0.43 -0.10 -0.15 -0.76 -0.86 
3 -0.64* -0.71* -0.14 0.13 0.28 0.28 -0.92** -0.99** 
4 -0.17 -0.23 -0.34 -0.51 0.01 0.29 -0.18 -0.52 
5 0.02 0.04 -0.11 -0.17 -0.25 -0.06 0.27 0.10 
6 -0.17 -0.07 -0.13 -0.23 0.31 0.28 -0.47 -0.35 
7 0.18 0.53 0.09 -0.11 -0.11 0.26 0.29 0.27 
8 0.68*** 0.91*** 0.54 0.62 0.44 0.70** 0.24 0.21 
9 0.78** 0.79** 0.90 0.87 -0.55** -0.95** 1.33*** 1.74*** 
10 2.74** 2.55* 0.92 0.83 0.16 -0.18 2.58** 2.73** 




Panel B.  Changes in Breadth and Operating Performance 
 High-turnover Institutions Medium-turnover Institutions Low-turnover Institutions 
∆BREADTHt 
Deciles Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
1 0.05*** 0.22*** 0.09*** -0.67*** -0.02 0.05** 0.03** -0.15*** -0.30*** 0.00 0.01 -0.06* -0.16*** -0.13*** 0.01 
2 0.02* 0.08*** 0.00 -0.16*** -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.03* -0.06*** 0.01 0.00 -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.07** -0.02 
3 0.01 0.03*** 0.00 -0.06*** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 -0.03** -0.06** 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
4 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.03** -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.04*** 0.02 0.01 
5 0.00 -0.02** -0.01*** 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
6 0.00 -0.02** -0.05** 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 
7 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.01 -0.04**
8 0.01 -0.03*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03*** 0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07*** 0.02 -0.01 
9 -0.01 -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.04** 0.01** 0.00 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.01 0.02** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.02** 0.00 
10 -0.02 -0.07*** 0.09*** 0.38*** 0.01 0.01 0.06*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.00 0.02* 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.02 
P10–P1 -0.07** -0.28*** -0.01 1.05*** 0.04 -0.04* 0.03 0.27*** 0.45*** 0.00 0.01 0.11*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.01 
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Panel C.  Regression on Return Predictive Power for Three Types of Institutions 
 
High-turnover Institutions Medium-turnover Institutions Low-turnover  Institutions 
Model M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 





























































































































































Ab_EG+1   
1.17 
12.26   
1.17 
12.29   
1.17 
12.16 
Ab_EG+2   
0.50 
9.112   
0.50 
9.14   
0.50 
9.080 




Each quarter, institutions are classified into tertiles based on their past four-quarter turnover ratios.  For each tertile 
of institutions, changes in breadth are calculated at the end of each quarter.  Panel A reports the 3- and 4-quarter 
abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-market/momentum benchmarks for each ∆BREADTHt decile.  Panel B 
reports abnormal earnings growth for the 5-year period around the quarter of changes in institutional breadth.  Panel 
C reports the regression results on return predictability.  The methods of calculating returns, abnormal earnings 
growth, and coefficient estimates are detailed in Table 3, 4, and 5, respectively.  In Panel C, the first number is the 
coefficient estimate and the second one is the t-statistic adjusted for serial correlation using a Newey-West estimator 
with a lag of up to four quarters.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 2. 9: Changes in Breadth by Types of Institutions 
 
Panel A.  Changes in Breadth and Future Returns 
 Passive Institutions  Banks and Insurance Companies 
Active Institutions 
Investment Companies and 
Investment Advisors 
All Others Active – Passive 
∆BREADTHt Deciles 3-quarter 4-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 
1 -0.85* -0.90 -2.20*** -2.38*** -0.95* -0.89* -1.35*** -1.48** 
2 -0.47 -0.82* -1.56*** -1.62*** -0.82** -0.53 -1.09*** -0.81** 
3 -0.02 0.09 -0.36 -0.53 -0.60 -1.06 -0.34 -0.61 
4 -0.60* -0.83** -0.50 -0.67 -0.80 -0.96 0.09 0.16 
5 -0.27 -0.38 0.04 -0.14 -0.04 -0.11 0.31 0.24 
6 -0.87** -0.73 0.08 0.00 -0.36 0.01 0.95* 0.73 
7 0.23 0.16 0.23 0.42 -1.43*** -1.78** 0.00 0.26 
8 0.12 0.36 -0.49 -0.62 -0.07 -0.18 -0.61* -0.98** 
9 0.46 0.37 0.94*** 1.30*** 0.43 0.54 0.48 0.93* 
10 0.69 0.21 2.13*** 1.84*** 0.78 0.07 1.44*** 1.63*** 
P10–P1 1.54* 1.12 4.33*** 4.22*** 1.73 0.95 2.79*** 3.10*** 
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Banks and Insurance Companies 
Active Institutions 
Investment Companies and Investment Advisors All Others 





























1 0.04 0.07** -0.11*** -0.30*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.19*** 0.00 -0.48*** -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.09** -0.22** 0.03 
2 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12*** -0.01 0.03** 0.02*** -0.03** -0.11*** -0.04** 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07* 0.02 
3 0.02* 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04** -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 
4 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03* 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
5 0.00 -0.01** -0.02*** 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02*** -0.03* 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
6 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03*** -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.02 
7 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.04* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
8 0.00 0.00 0.02* 0.06** 0.01 0.00 -0.01** 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
9 0.01 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.03** 0.00 -0.01 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.03 0.01 0.03** 0.05*** 0.05 -0.02 
10 0.00 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.15*** -0.01 0.00 -0.05*** 0.11*** 0.30*** 0.00 0.01 0.03** 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.02 





Panel C.  Regression Analysis on Return Predictive Power  
 
Passive Institutions 
Banks and Insurance Companies 
Active Institutions 
Investment Companies and 
Investment Advisors 
All Others 
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Ab_EG+1   
1.67 
18.04   
1.66 
18.13   
1.63 
17.53 
Ab_EG+2   
0.73 
16.17   
0.73 
16.11   
0.74 
16.55 
Adj.  Rsqr (%) 1.16 2.08 15.38 1.25 2.17 15.46 1.19 2.15 15.34 
 
Based on the classification by Thomson Financial (FTN) 13F Holding data set, the universe of institutions is 
partitioned into (i) passive institutions, including banks and insurance companies, (ii) active institutions, including 
investment companies and their managers and independent investment advisors, and (ii) all others.  Panel A reports 
the 3- and 4-quarter abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-market/momentum benchmarks for each 
∆BREADTHt decile.  Panel B reports abnormal earnings growth for the 5-year period around the quarter of changes 
in institutional breadth.  Panel C reports the regression results on return predictability.  The methods of calculating 
returns, abnormal earnings growth, and coefficient estimates are detailed in Table 3, 4, and 5, respectively.  In Panel 
C, the first number is the coefficient estimate and the second one is the t-statistic adjusted for serial correlation using 
a Newey-West estimator with a lag of up to four quarters.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
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CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONAL HERDING AND ITS IMPACT ON 
STOCK PRICES 
3.1. Introduction 
Institutional herding refers to the tendency that institutions “follow each other into (or out 
of) the same securities over some periods of time” (Sias 2004).  As institutions become the major 
players on the stock market, such behavior raises a concern that the aggregate trading by 
institutions could destabilize stock prices, especially when herds are not motivated by 
information about the value of firms.  In this study, I examine herding activities by institutions 
using a time-dependent framework in which herds are identified on the basis of the number of 
quarters that institutions continuously trade on the same side.  The results provide a 
comprehensive picture about the duration and the frequency of herds and present new evidence 
on the potential impact that herding exerts on stock prices.  
The extant literature has suggested four possible theories explaining why institutions 
herd.  First, institutions might infer information from each other’s trade and hence follow the 
crowd while ignoring their own private information.  This phenomenon is referred to as 
information cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992).  Second, investigative 
herding occurs when institutions trade in the same direction because they receive and investigate 
correlated signals (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1992 and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and 
Titman, 1994).  Third, herding could occur when the managers of institutions choose to trade in 
the same direction as others because they do not want to risk their reputation by acting 
differently from the herds (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990 and Trueman, 1994).  Finally, institutions 
may herd because of their preference toward certain characteristics of securities such as size or 
liquidity (Falkenstein, 1996, Gompers and Metrick, 2001 and Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003).   
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Despite the strong theoretical foundation on this field, empirical studies on whether 
institutions “follow each other” (Sias, 2004) in their trades are still limited.  Except for Sias 
(2004), who examines the trading by institutions in adjacent quarters, other studies have focused 
on institutional trading within one quarter, or intra-quarter herds.  In general, the intra-quarter 
literature has not found much evidence for the herding tendency.  For example, analyzing the 
quarterly trading of pension funds, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) conclude that there 
is virtually no herding in a typical stock-quarter.  Employing a similar technique, Grinblatt, 
Titman, and Wermers (1995) and Wermers (1999) also find little evidence of the systematic 
herding by institutions within a given quarter.  Explaining the weak findings, Lakonishok et al.  
(1992) argue that “the overall picture that emerges from this paper is one of institutional 
investors pursuing a broad diversity of trading styles that to a large extent offset each other”. 
The time-dependent approach employed in this study enables me to mitigate the 
offsetting effect embedded in the intra-quarter procedure.  Specifically, I apply a method used by 
Wermers (1999) that classifies a given stock-quarter as Buy if the proportion of institutions that 
are buyers is greater than the benchmark average and as Sell if otherwise.  Then for each stock, I 
identify herds on the basis of the consecutive quarters that the stock stays in the same Buy or Sell 
category.  In fact, individual herds can last for several quarters despite the fact that across the 
universe of stocks, herding can appear insignificant due to the offsetting effect caused by the 
diverse strategies of institutions suggested by Lakonishok et al. (1992).  Also, the time-
dependent approach better conveys the ‘following-each-other’ aspect of herds because herds are 
structured on the consideration that the aggregate trading by institutions in one quarter is related 
to their activities in the previous period.  
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Using the institutional ownership information obtained from the Thompson Financial 
CDA/Spectrum 13-F database over the 1980-2005 period, I document that it is common for 
institutions to engage in multi-quarter herds; herds lasting for at least two quarters account for 
more than 40 percent of the herd sample.  Moreover, institutions appear to herd as much on the 
buy side as on the sell side.  Examining subsamples of stocks, I document an inverse relation 
between herding activities and stock capitalizations; the smallest capitalization quintile accounts 
for more than 40 percent while the largest quintile accounts for only less than 10 percent of the 
herd sample.  According to Wermers (1999), information cascades are more likely to occur 
within small capitalization stocks because signals are noisier, and therefore, institutions tend to 
put more weight on the direction of trading by the crowd than on their own private information.  
Sias (2004) posits that investigative herds are more likely to occur among large capitalization 
securities, where information is reliable and institutions are more likely to receive and investigate 
correlated signals.  My finding about the inverse relation between herds and stock capitalization 
supports the information cascades hypothesis, which is consistent with the conclusion by the 
intra-quarter literature.  When I examine institutional trading activities in herds, I find that 
institutions are as active on the buy side as on the sell side. 
Next, I investigate the price impact of herding.  On one hand, herding could destabilize 
stock prices if money managers trade on concerns unrelated to the fundamental value of firms 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, and Falkenstein, 1996).  On the other hand, if herds are based on 
information, trading in herds could move stock prices toward, rather than away from, the 
equilibrium value of stocks (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1992 and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, 
and Titman, 1994).  The standard approach in the intra-quarter literature to investigate the price 
impact caused by herds is to examine whether there are return reversals after a herding quarter.  
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Wermers (1999) and Nofsinger and Sias (1999) analyze herding by mutual funds and 
institutional investors, respectively, and do not find reversals following a typical quarter.  Also, 
Sias (2004) documents a positive relation between the fraction of institutions buying a stock in a 
quarter and future returns.  The absence of reversals leads the authors to conclude that herding by 
institutions is rational and that its price impact is primarily related to the way in which 
information becomes incorporated into stock prices.   
Because trading by institutions is documented to have a strong contemporaneous impact 
on stock returns (Sias, Stark, and Titman, 2006, Wermers, 1999, and Nofsinger and Sias, 1999 
among others), there would be a causal relation between trading in a given herding quarter and 
future returns, which could make conclusions on reversals by intra-quarter studies biased.  
Formally, as institutions in subsequent quarters follow (or herd) others’ trades made in the first 
quarter, trading in herds will force stock prices to move in the direction of trades made in the 
first period.  As a result, when one examines stock returns following a single herding quarter, it 
is less likely that he/she can detect reversals and, therefore, the conclusions drawn are biased 
toward an understanding that herding does not destabilize prices but rather helps to accelerate the 
information dissemination process.  Consistent with the literature on the contemporaneous 
impact of institutional trading, I document a positive relation between trading during a herding 
period and stock returns over the same time window.  This finding stresses the above concern 
about the way reversals in returns are examined in the intra-quarter literature. 
To investigate the price impact, I employ two approaches.  First, I examine reversals 
based on stock returns calculated from the end of the last herding quarter forward.  In the 
absence of herding, returns over this period are free from the contemporaneous pressure caused 
by herds.  I document that stocks that institutions buy in herds underperform those institutions 
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sell in herds by 2.03 percent in raw returns during the first quarter after herds end.  The 
underperformance continuously increases to reach 3.64 percent in the four-quarter window.  
After controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum characteristics of stocks, I document 
that abnormal returns show similar reversal pattern.  Moreover, over the four quarters following 
the end of herds, stocks on the buy side underperform their benchmarks by 1.82 percent while 
those on the sell side outperform their benchmarks by 1.03 percent.  The reversals can be more 
evident if I take into account the fact that during the herding periods, stocks bought in herds 
consistently outperform while those sold in herds consistently underperform their benchmarks. 
When I examine market capitalization subsamples, I find that the above reversal pattern 
concentrates in small and medium stocks.  For these two samples, the difference in 4-quarter 
post-herd abnormal returns for buy herds and sell herds are 6.47 and 4.58 percent, respectively.  
For the largest size quintiles, such differences are small and insignificant.  Because institutions 
tend to engage in positive-feedback trading (Badrinath and Wahal, 2002, Wermers, 1999, and 
Nofsinger and Sias, 1999), I examine herding activities and their price impact across momentum 
subsamples.  I find that herding and return reversals prevail across the full range of momentum.  
Herds within each of the middle three momentum quintiles account for about 17 percent of the 
whole sample, while the numbers for those within each of the two extreme quintiles are around 
23 percent.  It suggests that positive-feedback trading is not the primary source for the herding 
behavior, which is consistent with Sias (2004).   
The above finding on reversals in return needs careful interpretation.  Because post-herd 
returns are calculated based on the recognition of the time the herds end, this method is subject to 
a looking-forward bias and, hence, the after-herd returns are biased toward finding reversals.  
However, I document that there is a positive relation between reversals and the duration of herds.  
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This relation suggests that stocks which experience more herds are subsequently associated with 
stronger reversals and stresses the possible price destabilizing impact associated with herding.  
Specifically, stocks that are purchased by institutions for only one quarter underperform their 
benchmark levels over the following four quarters by 1.19 percent while those that institutions 
keep purchasing for four quarters underperform their benchmarks by 4.53 percent.  On the sell 
side, the abnormal returns for those two extreme herd categories are +0.42 and +2.74 percent, 
respectively.   
Next, in an attempt to correct the above bias, I investigate whether it is possible to predict 
reversals in future returns based on current and past herding activities.  The results obtained in 
the first section of the paper suggest that when the price impact of current herding is weak, it is 
less likely that a herd will continue.  Hence, I argue that for a given quarter, if I group stocks 
conditional on the number of quarters herding already lasts, on the buy (sell) side, herding will 
tend to end if a stock belongs to the lowest (highest) return group.  If trading in herds destabilizes 
prices, these stocks will exhibit reversals in future returns.  Consistent with this expectation, I 
document that these two groups of stocks are more likely to experience changes in institutional 
trading direction.  Moreover, stocks that institutions buy in herds and that belong to the lowest 
return group subsequently underperform those that institutions sell in herds and that belong to the 
top return group.  Also, the former underperforms while the latter outperforms its benchmark in 
the following four quarters.  The finding suggests that, to a certain extent, herding by institutions 
destabilizes stock prices. 
Finally, I examine how herding behavior and its price impact vary over time.  I document 
that herds prevail for all subperiods and that the number of herds increases from one period to 
the next.  Examining capitalization subsamples, I find that the steady growth of herds among 
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stocks of the smallest capitalization is responsible for the overall increase in the herd sample.  
Consistent with Sias (2004), I document that the number of herds among medium and large 
stocks is declining over time.  The variation in the relative level of herding activities across 
market capitalizations among subperiods presents a natural experiment to examine how the 
intensity of herds and the reversals in future returns are related.  I find that for any subperiod, the 
stock sample that experiences more herds will subsequently experience stronger reversals.  Also, 
I document that for all sub-periods, stocks that are more likely to experience changes in 
institutional trading direction subsequently exhibit reversals in returns.  These findings add 
evidence to the destabilizing characteristics of herding. 
This is the first study that directly examines the duration and the frequency of herds.  It 
supplements the intra-quarter herding literature and provides a better understanding about the 
distribution of herds across durations, capitalizations and time periods.  I document that multi-
quarter herds are common in practice and, hence, future research in this field should consider the 
time-dependent pattern in trading by institutions.  Most important, by taking into account the 
duration of herds, I document that to a certain extent, trading by institutions in herds contains 
destabilizing impact.  This finding is contrary to the conclusion obtained in the intra-quarter 
literature, which is built on the assumption that herds are completed within one quarter.  In terms 
of the sources of herding, this paper adds new evidence supporting the hypothesis that herding by 
institutions is associated with information cascades.   
The remainder of this paper is organized in four sections.  The data and methodology are 
presented in Section 3.2.  Section 3.3 reports the empirical analysis on herding activities.  I 
analyze the relation between herding and stocks returns in section 3.4.  I conclude the paper in 
Section 3.5. 
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3.2. Data and Methodology 
I use Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum 13-F database to obtain information on 
institutional ownership from January 1980 to December 2005.  At the end of each quarter, I 
calculate the holding for each institution in each stock as a fraction of the security’s total shares 
outstanding.  Then, I calculate the changes in fractional holding for each institution in each 
stock-quarter.  I require that there must be at least five institutions trading a stock-quarter for that 
observation to be included in the sample.  According to Wermers (1999), this hurdle helps to 
better convey the concept of herding, which may not be appropriately defined if there are only 
one or two institutions trading in the same direction.  For each qualified stock-quarter, I classify 
an institution as buyer, seller, or inactive if its fractional holding increases, decreases, or remains 
unchanged, respectively, compared with its position at the end of the previous quarter.8  Then, I 
calculate the proportion of all active institutions that are buyers for each stock (i) in each quarter 
(t) as follow: 
i,tsellingnsinstitutioofNumberi,tbuyingnsinstitutioofNumber
i,tbuyingnsinstitutioofNumber
i,tBuy_ratio +=      (3.1) 
The intra-quarter herding literature suggests that the Buy_ratio above can be used to 
measure the herding activities of institutions in a given period.  For each stock-quarter, I 
construct the Institutional Trading Direction (ITD) by identifying whether during that period, the 
proportion of institutions buying that stock (Buy_ratio) is larger or smaller than the benchmark 
levels (E[Buy_ratio]).  Following Wermers (1999), the ITD is classified as follows: 
                                                 
8 Fractional holding can change due to small changes in the number of shares outstanding even though the number 
of shares held by an institution does not change.  Hence, following Sias (2004), if the number of shares held by a 
given investor is the same at the end of prior quarter and at the end of current quarter, I assign the institution to the 
inactive group (for that stock-quarter). 
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Institutional Trading Direction = Buy   if Buy_ratio > E[Buy_ratio] 
Institutional Trading Direction = Sell   if Buy_ratio < E[Buy_ratio] 
Institutional Trading Direction = Neutral  if Buy_ratio = E[Buy_ratio] 
To control for the fact that trading by institutions varies widely across market 
capitalizations, I first partition the stock sample into size quintiles based on NYSE capitalization 
cutoff values.  Following Wermers (1999), for each quintile I use the proportion of trades by 
institutions that are purchases as the average level (E[Buy_ratio]).9 
To strengthen the trading direction of the sample and hence improve the reliability of the 
herd measure, for each quarter and size quintile I rank the Buy_ratio into quintiles for Buy and 
Sell, independently.  I then assign the bottom quintile for Buy and the top quintile for Sell, which 
are least deviated from the benchmark level, to the ‘Neutral’ category.   
Sias (2004) argues that if institutions follow each other into or out of the same securities, 
then the above Buy_ratio of two adjacent quarters should be positively correlated.  In a time-
dependent context, I argue that if institutions herd, ITDs could be the same for multiple 
continuous quarters.  Hence, for each stock, if the ITD stays unchanged for i consecutive 
quarters, then I assign this stock-period to the i-quarter herd category.  For example, if ITD for 
MICROSOFT CORP is Buy (Sell) for the first three quarters of 1990 and then becomes Sell 
(Buy) in the last quarter, the first 3-quarter period is classified as a 3-quarter Buy (Sell) herd.  In 
order to examine how institutional trading and its impact on prices changes as herds proceed, I 
assign each quarter of a herd to a correspondent herding phase.  For example, for a 3-quarter 
                                                 
9 Following Wermers (1999), for a given quarter the benchmark proportion is computed by dividing the number of 
times that institutions purchase (observed across the universe of stocks within a given capitalization category) by the 
number of times that institutions either purchase or sell stocks.  
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herd, the first quarter is the starting phase, the second quarter is the second phase, and the last 
quarter is the ending phase of the herd.  Figure 3.1 explains how herds are constructed. 
For each herd, I calculate returns for the prior four quarters, for individual herding 
quarters, and for one, two, three, and four quarters following the herd, which will be referred to 
as past, contemporaneous, and post-herd returns, respectively.  I am most interested in the post-
herd returns because they can be used to evaluate the reversal associated with herding.  The 
requirement for 4-quarter returns after the herd ends limits my sample to the end of 2004. 
I use return data from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stock 
file.  For abnormal returns, I employ a method by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) 
in which returns of stocks are adjusted by returns of a benchmark portfolio with similar size, 
book-to-market, and momentum characteristics.  Formally, every quarter, stocks are assigned 
into quintiles based on market capitalization.  Then, stocks within a market value quintile are 
assigned into book-to-market quintiles, yielding 25 portfolios; Book-to-market ratio is calculated 
following Fama and French (1993).  Finally, stocks in each portfolio are sorted into quintiles 
based on the previous 4-quarter returns to yield 125 benchmark portfolios.  Quintiles-cut-off 
values for all three dimensions are obtained from NYSE stocks.  The abnormal returns for each 
herding phase (contemporaneous returns) are calculated based on the benchmark portfolios 
formed at the end of the prior quarter, while the post-herd abnormal returns are based on those 
formed at the end of the last herding quarter.   
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample.  Panel A reports the average number 
of stocks traded by the number of active institutions for three periods: 1980-1988, 1989-1996, 
and 1997-2004.  The number of stocks traded increases over time from an average of 3,143 per 
quarter in the first period to 4,951 in the most recent period.  Moreover, as the universe of 
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institutions increases, institutions appear to trade the same stocks more frequently.  For example, 
the number of stocks that are traded by at least 200 institutions in a given quarter increases from 
86 to 383 over the three periods.   
Panel B partitions the herd sample by the institutional trading intensity and reports the 
characteristics of stocks for each subsample.  It is evident that the number of active institutions is 
positively related to the market capitalization of stocks.  For stocks with less than 5 active 
institutions, the average market capitalization is $28.90 million.  Market capitalization increases 
along with the intensity of trading to reach $15.18 billion for the highest bracket of at least 200 
active institutions.  The number of active institutions appears to be negatively related to book-to-
market.  These findings suggest that institutions tend to be more active on large and mature 
stocks.  Finally, the relation between the number of active institutions and the momentum factors 
of stocks is not clear.  Momentum starts going up with the number of active institutions and 
reaches a peak of around 27 percent for stocks with 30-99 traders and then begins going down in 
trading intensity. 
3.3. Herding Activities by Institutions 
In table 2, I present the overall herding activities by institutions over the 1980-2004 
period.  The sample includes 133,335 herds, of which those lasting for at least two quarters 
account for more than 40 percent.  There is a negative relation between the number of herds and 
their duration; on both the buy side and the sell side, sample size declines by more than half as I 
move from one herding category to the next.  As herds of up to four quarters compose more than 
95 percent of the sample, I combine those of five quarters or more into one group, named ‘more 
than 4’.  For the investigation of the price impact of herds, I limit my analysis to those that last 
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for at most four quarters because the scarcity of longer herds makes analysis on this sample lack 
statistical power as well as economic significance.10   
In panel A, institutions appear to engage in herding both when they buy and when they 
sell stocks.  Neither buy herds nor sell herds dominate the sample, even though institutions herd 
slightly more on the buy side.  For the whole sample, buy herds account for 51.16 percent, while 
for herds that last for at least two quarters (hereafter referred to as the long-herd sample), the 
buy-to-sell ratio is about 53/47.  Also, for the long-herd sample, the number of buy herds is 
consistently larger than the correspondent number of sell herds.  It is interesting to note that 
while the intra-quarter literature documents slightly more herds on the sell side (Wermers, 1999 
and Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995), when adding the time dimension to the analysis, I 
document the contrary. 
In panel B, I present herding activities segregated by market capitalization prior to herds.  
Again, size quintile break values are based only on NYSE stocks.  There is an inverse relation 
between herding activities and stock capitalizations.  The smallest stocks account for more than 
40 percent of the herd sample, and this number declines all the way to about 10 percent for the 
largest stocks.  The same pattern can be observed if I focus on the long-herd sample.  According 
to Wermers (1999) and Sias (2004), herding associated with information cascades should be 
more likely to occur in small-capitalization stocks where information is scarce and signals are 
noisy and, therefore, money managers tend to disregard their own information to follow the 
consensus.  On the other hand, investigative herding should be strongest in large-capitalization 
stocks where information asymmetry is less severe and, hence, institutions tend to receive and 
                                                 
10 For example, the 10 or 11-quarter herd categories only has less than 100 observations for the whole 25-year 
period. 
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investigate the same signals.  The finding in this panel is consistent with Wermers (1999) and 
Sias (2004) who both find higher level of intra-quarter herds for small-capitalization stocks than 
other size categories and supports the information cascades hypothesis.  As in panel A, 
institutions herd more frequently on the buy side than on the sell side for all size quintiles.  Also, 
across size categories, the number of herds declines in the duration of herds.  
In table 3, I examine the trading activities by institutions for each herding category.  For 
each herd, I calculate the number of institutions that increase their fractional holding in that stock 
(or the number of buyers) for each herding phase.  For each quarter and herd category, I calculate 
the mean value of the number of institutional buyers by herding phase.  I apply the same 
procedure in calculating the number of active institutions.  Panel A reports the mean values of 
the two time series obtained, namely, the number of institutional buyers and the number of active 
institutions for each herding phase.  It is evident that the numbers of active institutions on the 
buy side and on the sell side are comparable.  Also, on both sides of herds, the differences in 
institutional trading activities from one herding phase to the next are marginal.  As expected, the 
number of institutions that are buyers is smaller for the sell side than for the buy side.  The 
general picture emerging from this panel is that institutions are as active on the sell side as on the 
buy side, and there is not much difference in their trading intensity across herding phases.  
In panel B, I examine institutional trading by market capitalization.  Trading activities by 
institutions appear to monotonically increase in size of firms, which is consistent with Gompers 
and Metrick (2001), who document that institutions prefer large and liquid stocks.  On average, 
the number of active institutions almost doubles from one capitalization quintile to the next; 
starting with less than 20 for the smallest stocks, this number reaches over 240 for the largest 
quintiles.  A similar trend can be seen on the number of institutional buyers.  These findings 
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justify the need for using a size benchmark, E[buy_ratio], in assigning institutional trading 
direction (ITD) to an individual stock-quarter.  Also, the number of buyers on the buy side is 
significantly larger than those on the sell side.  In summary, trading activities by institutions 
increase in market capitalization and within each capitalization quintile there are no significant 
changes in the intensity of trading from one herding phase to the next. 
3.4. Institutional Herding and Stock Returns 
As discussed earlier, herding by institutions can either stabilize or destabilize stock 
prices.  The rich theoretical works in this area suggest that if herds are motivated by information, 
then trades in herds will help to accelerate the price adjustment process and there will be no 
reversal in future returns.  Otherwise, if herds are associated with non-information sources, such 
as reputational concerns of managers or preference over certain characteristics of stocks, trading 
in herds will tend to destabilize stock prices and subsequent returns will be inversely related to 
current institutional demand; in other words, there will be reversals in returns following herds.  
Recent works in this field (Sias, 2004, Wermers, 1999, Nofsinger and Sias, 1999) document a 
weak positive relation between intra-quarter herds by institutions and subsequent returns and, 
therefore, suggest that institutional herding is rational and helps to enhance the price discovery 
process.   
I revisit this issue by examining returns of stocks after herding by institutions ends.  The 
key difference in my approach and the intra-quarter studies by Sias (2004), Wermers (1999), and 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) is the assumption of when herds end.  The underlying assumption in 
the intra-quarter herd literature is that herds could only last for one quarter.  However, there are 
no theoretical works suggesting such duration and, more important, as exhibited in the first 
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section, there is a significant proportion of herds that last for at least two quarters.  Hence, the 
intra-quarter herds approach, in fact, includes the late herding phases in the analysis of post-
herds reversals.  Because demand by institutions has strong influence on stock prices over the 
same period (Sias, Stark, and Titman, 2006, Wermers, 1999, and Nofsinger and Sias, 1999 
among others), trading in the late herding phases will force stock prices to move in the direction 
of trade made in the first period.  Hence, it is less likely that intra-quarter studies can detect 
reversal in future returns.  I employ two approaches in investigating the price impact of herding.  
First, I examine stock returns following the end of the last herding quarter.  This method allows 
me to exclude the contemporaneous impact of trade in herds in calculating post-herd returns.  
The limitation of this approach is that it requires the recognition of the time herds end and hence 
it is subject to a looking-forward bias.  Also by construction, after herds end institutions will 
either stay neutral or trade in the opposite direction.  As a result, post-herd returns will be biased 
toward reversals.  In the second approach, I predict return reversals based on the current herding 
activities and their impact on stock prices. 
3.4.1. Institutional herding and past, contemporaneous and post-herd returns 
In table 4, I report four-quarter stock returns prior to herds, quarterly returns during 
herding period, and cumulative one, two, three and four-quarter returns following the end of 
herds.  Every quarter, for each herd category, I first calculate the equally-weighted averages of 
returns for each window of interest.  The number reported is the mean value of the 99 averages 
obtained from the first step over the 25-year period.  In the buy and sell sections, the bottom lines 
exhibit the mean returns for the long-herd and for the full sample, respectively.  The last two 
lines in each panel report the differences in mean returns between buy and sell herd samples; the 
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number in each cell is the average of the quarterly pair differences in returns between the two 
samples.  For post-herding periods, these two lines represent the overall reversals or 
continuations in returns following the end of herds.   
In panel A and B, I examine raw returns, and abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-
market/momentum benchmarks, respectively.  In the first panel, several interesting points 
emerge.  First, consistent with Badrinath and Wahal (2002) and Nofsinger and Sias (1999), 
institutions appear to follow a positive-feedback strategy, buying stocks with higher and selling 
those with lower past returns.  On average, the 4-quarter momentum for the buy sample is 25.57 
percent, nearly 4 percent higher than the number for the sell herds.  Second, the relation between 
the duration of the herd and past returns is positive on the buy side while it appears negative on 
the sell side.  In other words, the higher (lower) the past returns, the longer the period that 
institutions will buy (sell) stocks; the absolute differences in 4-quarter momentum between 1-
quarter and 4-quarter herds on either the buy side or the sell side are about 13 percent.  Third, 
consistent with the contemporaneous literature, demand by institutions appears to exert 
significant impact on returns over the same period.  The contemporaneous returns are larger for 
buy herds than for sell herds.  Moreover, across herding phases, individual returns on the buy 
side are larger than the correspondent returns on the sell side.  Fourth, there is a positive relation 
between the magnitude of contemporaneous returns and the duration of herds.  For example, in 
the second phase of buy herds, the contemporaneous return for 2-quarter herds is 5.30 percent 
while the returns for 3 and 4-quarter herds are 5.92 and 8.40 percent, respectively.  The findings 
on contemporaneous returns confirm the need to control the late herding-phase impact in 
calculating post-herd returns and hence justify the time-dependent approach employed in this 
study. 
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Perhaps the most interesting issue is associated with the returns observed after herds end.  
On average, future 4-quarter returns following buy herds is 14.83 percent; 3.64 percent lower 
than those for sell herds.  Across other post herding windows, the differences in returns are all 
economically large and statistically significant.  When I compare individual returns of any given 
window, surprisingly, none of the post-herding returns on the buy side are larger than those on 
the sell side.  It should be noted that during herds, contemporaneous returns on the buy side are 
all larger than the correspondent returns on the sell side.  The reversal can also be seen through 
the monotonic relation between the duration of herds and future returns.  For the buy side, future 
returns decline steadily in the duration of herds, while for sell side, the longer the period 
institutions sell stocks, the larger the post-herding stock returns.  This trend prevails for every 
windows examined. 
Panel B reports abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-market/momentum 
benchmarks.  Most strikingly, post-herd abnormal returns are all negative on the buy side and all 
positive on the sell side.  On average, buy herds underperform their peers by 1.30 percent in 1-
quarter window and the underperformance extends to reach 1.82 percent after four quarters.  On 
the other side, sell herds consistently outperform benchmarks; the average abnormal returns are 
0.54 and 1.03 percent for the 1 and 4-quarter windows, respectively.  It should be noted that 
during the herding periods, stocks bought by institutions outperform while those sold by 
institutions underperform their benchmarks.  Again, the results need to be analyzed with caution 
because by construction, post herd returns tend to be biased toward reversals.  However, similar 
to panel A, there is a monotonic relation between the duration of herd and return reversals; 
longer herds on the buy side are associated with stronger underperformance while longer herds 
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on sell side are followed by higher abnormal returns.  Such a relation supports the argument that 
stocks that experience more herds subsequently experience stronger reversals. 
The findings in table 2 suggest that herds are primarily associated with information 
cascades.  Hence, I expect that the price impact of herding and, as a result, the reversals 
documented in panel A and B should be stronger for small-capitalization stocks.  I start by 
sorting the herd sample into quintiles based on the market capitalization of stocks at the end of 
the quarter prior to herds; the quintile cut-off values are based on NYSE stock rankings.  I redo 
the analysis on abnormal returns for each size category and report the average abnormal returns 
for the buy side and the sell side, and the differences between them in panel C. 
In panel C, the general reversals, which are represented by the differences in returns 
reported in the bottom two lines of any size panel, appear to be economically larger and 
statistically more significant for small and medium stocks than for large stocks.  Also, the 
reversals are significant on both sides of herds.  Formally, stocks bought in herds subsequently 
underperform their benchmark while those sold in herds subsequently outperforms their peers.  
The inclusion of the benchmark enables me to have a better view on the contemporaneous 
impact and reversals for buy and sell herds individually.  For the first three quintiles, stocks that 
institutions buy (sell) in herds significantly outperform (underperform) benchmark average 
during the herding period and, then, significantly underperform (outperform) the same 
benchmark after herds end.  It should be noted that, reversals are stronger for the long-herd 
sample than for the full sample, which again adds evidence to the price impact of herding. 
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3.4.2. Current herding activities by institutions and return reversals 
The above approach of identifying the herds and then calculating post-herd returns 
suffers a looking-forward bias and, hence, post-herd returns are biased toward reversals.  In this 
section, I use information on current herding activities to anticipate whether herds will continue 
and, hence, whether I can predict reversals in returns.  Formally, based on the finding in table 4 
that the ex-post duration of herds monotonically increases in current contemporaneous returns, 
for a given quarter I create subsamples of stocks based on the number of quarters that herds 
already occur on a given stocks.  Then, within each subsample, I rank stocks into tertiles based 
on this quarter’s abnormal returns.  Again, abnormal returns are based on the benchmark 
portfolio formed at the end of the prior quarter.  I expect that on the buy side, institutions will 
tend to stop buying or start selling stocks that experience the lowest returns.  Similarly, on sell 
side, institutions will more likely to either stop selling or even start buying stocks that experience 
the highest abnormal returns.  I argue that if herding contains a destabilizing impact, stocks that 
institutions tend to change their trading behavior will be more likely to experience return 
reversals.   
In panel A of table 6, I track trading activities by institutions in the four quarters after 
stocks are assigned into portfolios according to the above procedure.  The purpose is to examine 
whether institutions are more likely to reverse their trading behavior for these two extreme types 
of stocks discussed above.  The first two columns in this panel exhibit herding information in 
current quarter crossing with the contemporaneous abnormal returns of stocks.  The last four 
columns report the proportion of trading by institutions that belong to different trading 
categories: Sell, Neutral, and Buy.  I am most interested in the sample of current buy herds with 
the lowest abnormal returns and current sell herds with the highest abnormal returns.  Consistent 
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with this expectation, on the sell section, the proportion of ‘Sell’ following herds with the highest 
returns is the smallest compared with other correspondent numbers.  In the first quarter, the 
proportion of sell for the bottom returns tertile is 44.25 percent, compared to 45.82 and 48.60 for 
the other two categories.  In the second quarter, the difference widens; 41.36 percent versus 
44.91 and 47.41, respectively.  The result suggests that for sell herds, institutions tend to change 
their trading direction if stocks experience higher abnormal returns than their peers.  Similarly, 
on the buy section, for stocks that experience lowest returns, the proportion of the sample that 
institutions remain the net buyers in the following four quarters is the smallest.  In the first 
quarter, the proportion of buy is 46.31 percent for the ‘Buy with the lowest returns’, compared to 
47.43 and 50.17 percent for the other two samples. Such difference widens in the next quarters.  
This suggests that for buy herds, institutions are more likely to change their trading direction on 
stocks that experience low contemporaneous returns.   
Next, I examine future returns for those two types of stocks namely ‘sell herds with the 
highest returns’ and ‘buy herds with the lowest returns’ and report raw returns and abnormal 
returns results in panel B and C, respectively.  In panel B, the first two lines in each size section 
reports quarterly abnormal returns for those two portfolios and the last line reports their 
differences in returns.  The bottom section summarizes returns for the whole sample.  It is 
evident that stocks sold in herds by institutions subsequently outperform those institutions 
bought in herds.  The differences in returns over the last three quarters are well above one 
percent and all significant.  When examining individual size quintiles, I can see the same pattern 
of reversal in returns; especially for the first two quintiles where quarterly differences in returns 
are about two percent.  For other size categories, the differences in returns are positive but lack 
consistency in statistical power.   
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Panel C summarizes the results on abnormal returns.  Consistent with panel B, reversals 
in returns are significant during the last three quarters and concentrate on the first two size 
quintiles.  Moreover, with the adjustment of benchmark returns, reversals for individual herd 
sample become clearer.  From the second quarter forward, stocks sold in herds by institutions 
subsequently outperform their benchmarks while those bought in herds underperform their peer.  
This pattern prevails for all size quintiles but again concentrates in the first two size groups.  The 
findings on reversal in this table suggest that to a certain extent, herding by institutions may 
destabilize stock prices. 
3.4.3. Institutional herding and momentum 
Institutions are documented to engage in positive-feedback trading, buying stocks with 
high and selling stocks with low past returns (Badrinath and Wahal, 2002, Wermers, 1999, and 
Nofsinger and Sias, 1999).  In table 3, I observe a positive relation between the duration of herds 
and past returns, hence, it is important to examine whether this common trading strategy is the 
source of herding by institutions.  If that is the case, I expect that sell herds should be 
concentrated in low momentum stocks while buy herds should be formed mainly in high 
momentum samples.  Otherwise, I expect that herding as well as its impact on prices prevails for 
the full range of momentum. 
To evaluate the role of positive-feedback trading, each quarter I assign herds to NYSE-
based momentum quintiles.  Panel A of table 5 exhibits the frequency of herds across momentum 
categories.  Most importantly, I document that institutional herding prevails for all momentum 
quintiles with comparable magnitude.  Consistent with Wermers (1999) who document that 
intra-quarter herds are largest for the two extreme momentum quintiles, I find that institutions 
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engage in herding more frequently among stocks of the top and bottom samples.  These two 
extreme momentum groups compose about 48 percent of the herd sample.  When I examine how 
herds of a given duration vary across momentum quintiles, I find that on the sell side, the 
proportion of institutional herding appears to monotonically decline in past returns, while on the 
buy side, the higher momentum is associated with the larger proportion of herds.  This finding is 
consistent with the positive-feedback behavior of institutions.   
Panel B reports abnormal returns around herding periods.  After the herds end, the 
differences in returns between stocks bought and those sold in herds are all negative and 
significant, suggesting that price impact prevails for all momentum samples.  Moreover, for buy 
herds, contemporaneous abnormal returns in most cases are positive and significant, especially 
for the first two herding phases.  However, these stocks subsequently perform worse than the 
benchmark averages and the underperformance is significant for at least three momentum 
quintiles.  On the other side, stocks sold in herds significantly underperform contemporaneous 
benchmark portfolios while they appear to outperform the post-herd benchmarks in most cases.  
Again, across momentum quintiles, the reversals for the long-herd sample are more pronounced 
than the average level of the whole sample.  
In summary, the results in the panel suggest that while institutions follow momentum 
trading, such a common strategy is not the primary source for their herds and that herding shows 
destabilizing impacts across momentum samples. 
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3.4.4. Institutional herding over time 
In this section, I examine how herding by institutions and its price impact changes over 
time.  I split the sample into three periods of approximately equal length: 1980-1988, 1989-1996, 
and 1997-2004.  Panel A reports the herding frequency.  As the number of institutions as well as 
the number of stocks listed increases, it is not surprising to see that the herds sample is getting 
larger in the later period.  It is evident that multi-quarter herds by institutions are not limited to 
any period.  Across three subperiods, the numbers of herds that last for two quarters or more 
consistently account for around 40 percent of the samples.  Also, for those long herds, the 
number of buy herds is slightly larger than the number of sell herds for all herding categories, 
consistent with the findings in table 2. 
In panel B, I decompose herds by stock capitalization.  Because herds concentrate in 
small stocks, which makes other capitalization samples relatively small, I combine two middle 
size quintiles and two top quintiles and name them medium and large size samples, respectively.  
I find that the proportion of herds on small stocks increases over time while those on medium 
and large stocks steadily decline.  Herds on medium stocks in the first nine years account for 
more than 40 percent of the sample but this ratio declines to less than 35 percent in the most 
recent period.  Similarly, herds on the largest sample lose more than 6 percent over time and 
account for about only 20 percent of the sample in recent years.  Starting with around 30 percent, 
the proportion of herds for small stocks eventually reaches more than 45 percent of the sample.  
Over time, long herds for small stock increase by 185 percent while medium and large stocks 
increase by 27 and 17 percent, respectively.  This analysis suggests that the increases in herding 
activities over time exhibited in panel A are primarily caused by the huge escalation in herding 
within small capitalization stocks.   
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The above findings on the changes in distribution of herds among three periods have 
several implications on the price impact of herding.  As herding becomes more intense over time, 
I expect that the price impact be stronger in recent periods.  Also, as the relative intensity of 
herds among market capitalization categories changes from one period to the next, it presents a 
natural experiment to examine whether the relative magnitudes of price impact change in the 
same direction.  I expect that stronger herds are associated with stronger reversals. 
In panel C, I examine the differences in abnormal returns for buy and sell herds for each 
market capitalization group as well as for the whole sample by three periods.  First, for all 
periods examined, the overall reversals in returns after herds end, which are represented by the 
difference in returns between stocks bought in herds and those sold in herds and are exhibited in 
the last two lines in each section, prevail and appear significant for all periods examined.  
Moreover, the magnitude of reversals increases over the three periods, which is consistent with 
the above argument about the destabilizing impact.  Second, when I relate the reversals and the 
magnitude of herds within a given period, an interesting pattern emerges: more herds, larger 
reversals.  For example, for the first period, the ranking by number of herds among market 
capitalizations, observed in panel B, is: Medium, small and large, and the correspondent ranking 
in reversals is the same.  When I look at the long herd sample, as large and small size samples 
switch their positions in ranking for herds, their positions in ranking for reversals are switched as 
well.   
Panel D reports the differences in contemporaneous and quarterly future returns for 
stocks that belong to extreme herding samples namely ‘sell herds with the highest returns’ and 
‘buy herds with the lowest returns’.  The panel is structured in the same manner as panel C of 
table 6.  It is evident that the differences in future returns are positive and significant in at least 
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two quarters for any period examined.  This suggests that, to a certain extent, it is possible to 
predict reversals in returns based on the information about current herding activities and 
confirms the earlier conclusion that the aggregate herding by institutions may destabilize stock 
prices.  Examining individual capitalization categories, I find that the reversals occur mainly 
within the small size sample, which is consistent with the finding that herding is concentrated in 
this segment of the market. 
3.5. Conclusions 
In this paper, I examine the tendency of institutions to herd in their trades from 1980 to 
2004.  I document that it is common for herds by institutions to last for more than one quarter.  
Over the 25 years examined, herds that last for at least two quarters account for more than 40 
percent of the herd sample.  This finding has important implication for evaluating the price 
impact of herding.  It suggests that the appropriate window to examine post-herd returns is from 
the end of the last herding quarter forward instead of from the end of any herding quarter.  This 
recognition distinguishes my study from the intra-quarter herd literature. 
Contrary to the conclusions of the intra-quarter literature, I document that there are 
reversals in stock returns following the end of herds.  First, I find that stocks bought in herds 
subsequently underperform those sold in herds.  The reversals are economically large and 
statistically significant for up to four quarters.  Second, I show that stocks bought in herds 
subsequently underperform while those sold in herds subsequently outperform their benchmarks.  
It should be noted that during herding periods, stocks bought in herds outperform while those 
sold in herds underperform their benchmark portfolios.  Finally, I document that it is possible to 
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predict reversals based on current herding activities and their contemporaneous impact on stocks 
prices.  
In terms of the cause of herds, consistent with the intra-quarter literature, I find that herds 
form disproportionately more frequently on small and medium size stocks, which supports the 
information cascades hypothesis.  I also document that the common positive-feedback trading by 
institutions is not responsible for their herding behavior. 
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3.6. Figure for Chapter Three 
 Time Quarter1 Quarter2 Quarter3 Quarter4 Quarter5 Quarter6 Quarter7 






























Figure 3. 1.  Identify Institutional Herds 
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3.7. Tables for Chapter Three 
 
Table 3. 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A.  Average Number of Securities and Trading Intensive 
 Sample Average 1980-1988 1989-1996 1997-2004 
≥ 1 trader   4,072    3,143    4,238    4,951  
≥ 5 traders   3,013    2,048    3,143    3,969  
≥ 10 traders   2,408    1,534    2,482    3,317  
≥ 20 traders   1,817    1,050    1,772    2,724  
≥ 30 traders   1,490    805    1,385    2,366  
≥ 50 traders   1,089    546    956    1,834  
≥ 100 traders   580    263    492    1,025  
≥ 150 traders   339    148    292    600  
≥ 200 traders   211    86    181    383  
 
Panel B.  Stocks Characteristics and Trading Intensive 
 Size (Million $) Book-to-Market Momentum 
1-5 traders  28.90   1.04     13.34% 
5-9 traders 68.84   0.95  17.43% 
10-19 traders  134.09   0.85  20.49% 
20-29 traders  242.58   0.75  23.58% 
30-49 traders  410.53   0.70  26.87% 
50-99 traders  867.67   0.68  27.43% 
100-149 traders  1,855.86   0.65  25.90% 
150-199 traders  3,342.10   0.63  25.03% 
≥ 200 traders  15,177.24   0.58  22.05% 
 
Every quarter during the 1980-2004 period, I calculate the number of securities traded by at least 1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, 
100, 150 and 200 institutional investors.  Panel A reports the average of the time-series of these figures for three 
periods: 1980-1988, 1989-1996, and 1997-2004.  Panel B reports the relation between the intensive of trading by 
institutions and the characteristics of stocks.  Every quarter, stocks are partitioned on the basis of the number of 
institutions trading.  Then, the average size, book-to-market, and momentum factors are calculated for each 
subsample.  The numbers reported are the average of the time-series obtained.   
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Table 3. 2: Herding Activities 
 
Panel A.  Distribution of Herds by Herding Duration 
 Sell Side Buy Side   
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Panel B.  Distribution of Herds across Market Size Quintiles 
 Sell side Buy side   















































































































































This table reports the number of herds for different duration.  In panel A, the first two numbers are the number of herds and its percentage of the whole 
sample, respectively.  The last two sets of number are the cumulative number for Sell herds and Buy herds, respectively.  Panel B reports herding activities 




Table 3. 3: Institutional Trading by Herding Phases 
 
Panel A.  Trading in Herds by Herding Phases 
 
Sell herding phases Buy herding phase 
Herding 
duration 
















1 26.21 55.99    
34.11 
54.20    
2 28.37 60.77 
28.66 




58.51   



























Panel B.  Trading in Herds by Phases across Size Quintiles 
  Herding phases for Buy  Herding phases for Sell 
Size Herding duration 
1st   
quarter 
2nd    
quarter 
3rd   
quarter 
4th   
quarter 
1st   
quarter 
2nd   
quarter 
3rd    
quarter 
4th   
quarter 
 1 5.74 11.96       
9.16 
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 1 16.82 33.10       
23.25 
33.22    
2 2 17.34 34.20 
17.33 
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 1 28.81 58.60       
38.54 
58.76    
3 2 29.37 60.41 
29.83 
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 1 48.64 103.44       
63.35 
103.47    
4 2 49.07 104.98 
50.41 
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145.55 
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This table reports institutional trading over different herding phases.  Each herding phase, I report the mean values 
of the number of institutional buyers and of the number of active institutions that either buy or sell stock.  Panel A 
summarizes institutional trading for the whole sample while panel B disaggregates trading by market capitalization 
of stocks. 
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Table 3. 4: Post-herding Stock Returns 
 







Post herding periods 
(cumulative returns) 
 
4 quarters 1st  quarter 2nd  quarter 3rd  quarter 4th  quarter 1 quarter 2 quarters 3 quarters 4 quarters 
Buy 1 22.12*** 6.73***    3.03*** 6.99*** 11.49*** 15.85*** 
Buy 2 29.27*** 7.92*** 5.30***   2.88** 6.53*** 10.41*** 14.16*** 
Buy 3 33.00*** 9.84*** 5.92*** 4.30***  2.20** 4.93*** 8.64*** 12.27*** 
Buy 4 35.09*** 11.32*** 8.40*** 5.21*** 4.24*** 1.58 4.58*** 7.82*** 11.42*** 
Excl. 1 31.23*** 8.88*** 5.90*** 4.67*** 4.24*** 2.42*** 5.72*** 9.39*** 13.01*** 
All 25.57*** 7.61*** 5.90*** 4.67*** 4.24*** 2.84*** 6.57*** 10.77*** 14.83*** 
Sell 1 24.44*** 4.12***    4.54*** 8.70*** 12.77*** 17.44*** 
Sell 2 19.12*** 3.57*** 3.40***   4.87*** 9.47*** 14.30*** 19.21*** 
Sell 3 13.85*** 1.45 2.53** 3.99***  5.48*** 9.93*** 14.42*** 20.45*** 
Sell 4 11.73*** 1.47 1.28 2.73** 3.73*** 6.92*** 11.53*** 16.92*** 22.57*** 
Excl. 1 16.98*** 2.67*** 2.94*** 3.58*** 3.73*** 5.26*** 9.90*** 14.68*** 19.95*** 
All 21.69*** 3.63*** 2.94*** 3.58*** 3.73*** 4.88*** 9.24*** 13.58*** 18.47*** 
Excl. 1 14.25*** 6.21*** 2.96*** 1.09* 0.51 -2.85*** -4.18*** -5.29*** -6.94*** 
All 3.88*** 3.98*** 2.96*** 1.09* 0.51 -2.03*** -2.66*** -2.82*** -3.64*** 
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Post herding periods 
(cumulative returns) 
 
4 quarters 1st  quarter 2nd  quarter 3rd  quarter 4th  quarter 1 quarter 2 quarters 3 quarters 4 quarters 
Buy 1 -1.37*** 2.14***    -1.20*** -1.34*** -1.17*** -1.19*** 
Buy 2 0.08 3.53*** 0.99***   -1.08*** -1.33*** -1.51*** -1.90*** 
Buy 3 1.46* 5.19*** 1.88*** 0.18  -1.49*** -2.57*** -2.80*** -3.51*** 
Buy 4 3.40** 6.57*** 4.07*** 1.40*** 0.21 -2.15*** -2.86*** -3.86*** -4.53*** 
Excl. 1 0.96*** 4.42*** 1.63*** 0.59* 0.21 -1.44*** -1.98*** -2.31*** -2.81*** 
All -0.51*** 3.02*** 1.63*** 0.59* 0.21 -1.30*** -1.59*** -1.61*** -1.82*** 
Sell 1 -0.35 -0.31**    0.29* 0.37* 0.13 0.42 
Sell 2 -1.92*** -0.66*** -0.73***   0.66** 1.09*** 1.49*** 1.75*** 
Sell 3 -2.44*** -2.70*** -1.36*** -0.25  1.02** 1.22* 1.13 2.19** 
Sell 4 -1.93*** -2.85*** -2.78*** -1.20*** -0.83* 2.32*** 2.52*** 2.63** 2.74** 
Excl. 1 -2.08*** -1.50*** -1.16*** -0.57* -0.83* 0.93*** 1.30*** 1.52*** 2.01*** 
All -0.98*** -0.75*** -1.16*** -0.57* -0.83* 0.54*** 0.73*** 0.66*** 1.03*** 
Excl. 1 3.04*** 5.92*** 2.79*** 1.16*** 1.04 -2.37*** -3.28*** -3.83*** -4.82*** 
All 0.48 3.77*** 2.79*** 1.16*** 1.04 -1.85*** -2.32*** -2.27*** -2.85*** 
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Panel C.  Size/BTM/Momentum Adjusted Abnormal Returns by Size 
 Pre-herd period 
Herding periods  
(quarterly returns) 
Post herding periods 
(cumulative returns) 
 
4 quarters 1st  quarter 2nd  quarter 3rd  quarter 4th  quarter 1 quarter 2 quarters 3 quarters 4 quarters 
Size 1 (Smallest) 
Buy 1.59* 5.98*** 2.52*** 1.66** -0.75 -2.21*** -2.23*** -2.62*** -3.64*** 
 -0.38 2.42*** 2.52*** 1.66** -0.75 -2.12*** -2.34*** -2.27*** -2.78*** 
Sell -2.88*** -5.81*** -1.81*** -1.26* -1.82 1.42*** 1.38* 2.15** 2.83*** 
 -1.68*** -4.20*** -1.81*** -1.26* -1.82 0.66** 0.71 0.58 1.27* 
Buy-Sell 4.47*** 11.79*** 4.33*** 2.92*** 1.07 -3.63*** -3.61*** -4.77*** -6.47*** 
 1.30** 6.62*** 4.33*** 2.92*** 1.07 -2.78*** -3.05*** -2.85*** -4.05*** 
Size 2 
Buy 1.16 5.34*** 1.53*** 0.26 -0.19 -1.06*** -1.85*** -2.10*** -2.55*** 
 -0.54 4.64*** 1.53*** 0.26 -0.19 -1.05*** -1.40*** -1.35*** -1.60*** 
Sell -1.52*** 0.17 -1.03*** -1.07* -0.43 0.64* 1.22** 1.45** 2.03* 
 -0.69 0.88*** -1.03*** -1.07* -0.43 0.71*** 1.02*** 1.13*** 1.43*** 
Buy-Sell 2.67** 5.17*** 2.56*** 1.33* 0.24 -1.69*** -3.07*** -3.55*** -4.58*** 
 0.15 3.77*** 2.56*** 1.33* 0.24 -1.76*** -2.42*** -2.48*** -3.04*** 
Size 3 
Buy 1.44 5.19*** 0.98*** 0.09 0.80 -0.97*** -1.21** -1.84*** -2.09*** 
 -0.37 4.34*** 0.98*** 0.09 0.80 -0.62*** -0.77*** -1.07*** -1.02** 
Sell -2.41*** 0.57* -0.80** 0.36 -0.04 1.02*** 1.37*** 1.27** 1.15 
 -0.89 1.42*** -0.80** 0.36 -0.04 0.70*** 0.92*** 0.89*** 0.99** 
Buy-Sell 3.85** 4.62*** 1.78*** -0.27 0.84 -1.99*** -2.58*** -3.12*** -3.24*** 
 0.52 2.92*** 1.78*** -0.27 0.84 -1.32*** -1.70*** -1.96*** -2.01*** 
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Table 3.4: Post-herding Stock Returns 
Size 4 
Buy -0.08 2.26*** 0.85*** 0.23 0.59 -0.20 -0.77* -0.96* -0.15 
 -0.86* 2.34*** 0.85*** 0.23 0.59 -0.13 -0.22 -0.34 -0.05 
Sell -2.05** 2.10*** 0.41 0.48 0.24 0.42 0.28 0.16 0.31 
 -0.36 2.12*** 0.41 0.48 0.24 -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 
Buy-Sell 1.97 0.16 0.44 -0.25 0.35 -0.62 -1.05* -1.12 -0.46 
 -0.50 0.22 0.44 -0.25 0.35 -0.10 -0.30 -0.37 -0.08 
Size 5 (Largest) 
Buy 1.26 0.57* -0.39 0.11 0.49 -0.28 -0.44 -0.64 -0.85 
 0.43 1.23*** -0.39 0.11 0.49 0.27 0.15 0.21 0.28 
Sell -0.70 3.20*** 0.37 -0.84* 0.96 0.18 0.56 1.03* 1.26* 
 -0.09 2.83*** 0.37 -0.84* 0.96 -0.22 -0.07 -0.15 -0.34 
Buy-Sell 1.95 -2.62*** -0.76* 0.95 -0.47 -0.46 -0.99 -1.67* -2.11* 
 0.52 -1.60*** -0.76* 0.95 -0.47 0.50 0.22 0.36 0.62 
 
This table reports four-quarter returns prior to herds, quarterly returns during herding period, and cumulative one, two, three and four-quarter returns 
following the end of herds.  Panel A and B report raw returns and abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-market/momentum benchmark level, 
respectively.  Every quarter, for each herd category, I calculate the equally-weighted averages of returns for each windows of interest.  The number reported 
is the mean value of the 99 quarterly averages obtained from the first step over the 25-year period.  The last two lines for each section, “Excl. 1” and “All”, 
report returns for the sample of long herds, which last for at least two periods, and for the full sample, respectively.  The last two lines in each panel report 
the differences in the average returns for buy and sell herds; number in each cell is the average of the quarterly pair differences in returns between buy and 
sell sample.  Panel C disaggregates abnormal returns results on market capitalization.  It reports the average abnormal returns for buy herds, sell herds and 
the differences between them.  The two numbers for each cell are associated with the “Excl. 1” sample and “All” sample, respectively. ***, **, and * denote 





Table 3. 5: Institutional Herding and Future Returns 
 






Direction  Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
 Sell 48.60 47.41 46.01 45.33 
Low Neutral 21.75 22.81 24.19 24.40 
  Buy 29.66 29.78 29.81 30.27 
 Sell 45.82 44.91 44.10 44.32 
Medium Neutral 21.62 22.77 23.83 23.81 
  Buy 32.56 32.32 32.07 31.87 
 Sell 44.25 41.36 40.97 41.50 







  Buy 34.37 35.46 35.14 34.22 
 Sell 32.72 36.18 37.61 37.62 
Low Neutral 20.96 21.99 23.33 23.73 
  Buy 46.31 41.83 39.06 38.65 
 Sell 32.05 34.14 35.19 35.51 
Medium Neutral 20.52 22.06 23.00 23.09 
  Buy 47.43 43.81 41.82 41.40 
 Sell 30.02 30.59 32.39 33.90 











Panel B.  Quarterly Raw Returns of Stocks that Institutions Tend to Change Their Herding 
Behavior 
Size  Past Herds Quarter 0 Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
1 Sell with high returns 28.76*** 4.85*** 5.22*** 4.96*** 5.27*** 
1 Buy with low returns -15.80*** 3.26** 2.84* 2.76* 2.78* 
(Smallest) Difference 44.56*** 1.59*** 2.38*** 2.20*** 2.49*** 
2 Sell with high returns 23.59*** 3.75*** 4.71*** 4.53*** 4.27*** 
2 Buy with low returns -13.65*** 3.39** 2.55* 2.45** 2.70** 
 Difference  37.23*** 0.36 2.16*** 2.08*** 1.58*** 
3 Sell with high returns 21.43*** 3.52*** 4.21*** 4.08*** 3.81*** 
3 Buy with low returns -12.48*** 3.86*** 3.16** 2.55** 3.17*** 
 Difference  33.90*** -0.34 1.05 1.53*** 0.64 
4 Sell with high returns 20.02*** 3.57*** 4.17*** 4.11*** 3.98*** 
4 Buy with low returns -11.16*** 4.13*** 2.48** 2.94** 3.95*** 
 Difference 31.18*** -0.56 1.69*** 1.17* 0.03 
5 Sell with high returns 17.98*** 2.93*** 3.80*** 4.42*** 3.82*** 
5 Buy with low returns -9.78*** 3.75*** 2.52** 2.38** 3.18*** 
(Largest) Difference 27.76*** -0.82 1.28* 2.05*** 0.65 
All Sell with high returns 24.01*** 3.92*** 4.52*** 4.54*** 4.34*** 
 Buy with low returns -13.71*** 3.47*** 2.61** 2.68** 3.07** 
 Difference 37.72*** 0.45 1.91*** 1.86*** 1.27** 
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Panel C.  Quarterly Abnormal Returns of Stocks that Institutions Tend to Change Their Herding 
Behavior 
Size Past Herds Quarter 0 Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
1 Sell with high returns 24.32*** -0.17 0.48 0.52 1.10** 
1 Buy with low returns -21.01*** -1.05** -1.25*** -1.51*** -1.53*** 
(Smallest) Difference 45.33*** 0.88* 1.73*** 2.03*** 2.63*** 
2 Sell with high returns 19.91*** -0.48 0.60** 0.70*** 0.56* 
2 Buy with low returns -18.48*** -0.24 -0.98*** -1.08*** -0.91*** 
 Difference 38.39*** -0.24 1.58*** 1.78*** 1.47*** 
3 Sell with high returns 17.59*** -0.64*** 0.22** 0.32 0.20 
3 Buy with low returns -17.14*** 0.45 -0.12 -0.83** -0.42 
 Difference 34.74*** -1.09** 0.34 1.15** 0.63 
4 Sell with high returns 16.16*** -0.44* 0.20 0.30 0.31 
4 Buy with low returns -15.84*** 0.76** -1.04*** -0.72** 0.09 
 Difference 32.00*** -1.20** 1.25*** 1.03** 0.22 
5 Sell with high returns 14.11*** -0.61** -0.17 0.62*** 0.18 
5 Buy with low returns -14.34*** 0.33 -0.70** -0.81** -0.34 
(Largest) Difference 28.45*** -0.94* 0.53 1.43*** 0.52 
All Sell with high returns 20.04*** -0.49*** 0.27 0.48*** 0.57*** 
 Buy with low returns -18.78*** -0.33 -1.03*** -1.16*** -0.90*** 
 Difference 38.82*** -0.16 1.30*** 1.64*** 1.46*** 
 
Herds sample is partitioned based on current herding duration and contemporaneous returns of stocks.  Every 
quarter, stocks are sorted (independently for buy and sell) on the number of quarters institutions already herds.  
Within each category of herds, stocks are assigned into tertiles based on the contemporaneous abnormal returns.  
Panel A reports the trading direction for the following four quarters.  Panel B reports raw returns by market 
capitalization for two samples: (i) stocks that are sold in herds and that experience the highest contemporaneous 
abnormal returns and (ii) stocks that are bought in herds and that experience the lowest contemporaneous abnormal 
returns.  They are stocks that institutions tend to change their herding behavior.  Panel C reports abnormal returns.  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 3. 6: Herding by Institutions and Momentum 
 
Panel A.  Distribution of Herds by Herding Duration and Momentum Factor 























1 0.89 9,141 3,400 1,592 803 902 9,142 2,887 1,275 617 567 30,326 12,043 
(Lowest)  30.14 11.21 5.25 2.65 2.97 30.15 9.52 4.20 2.03 1.87 23.19 22.66 
2 1.46 6,714 2,507 1,094 523 645 6,889 2,413 1,045 521 534 22,885 9,282 
  29.34 10.95 4.78 2.29 2.82 30.10 10.54 4.57 2.28 2.33 17.50 17.47 
3 1.67 6,460 2,376 999 408 567 6,667 2,542 1,068 545 569 22,201 9,074 
  29.10 10.70 4.50 1.84 2.55 30.03 11.45 4.81 2.45 2.56 16.98 17.08 
4 1.73 6,822 2,412 979 452 483 6,729 2,654 1,261 584 666 23,042 9,491 
  29.61 10.47 4.25 1.96 2.10 29.20 11.52 5.47 2.53 2.89 17.62 17.86 
5 1.48 9,801 3,061 1,097 480 415 9,269 3,980 1,969 1,049 1,196 32,317 13,247 
(Highest)  30.33 9.47 3.39 1.49 1.28 28.68 12.32 6.09 3.25 3.70 24.71 24.93 
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Panel B.  Size/BTM/Momentum Adjusted Abnormal Returns by Momentum 
 Pre-herd 
period Herding periods (quarterly) Post herding periods (cumulative)  
 4 quarters 1st  quarter 2nd  quarter 3rd  quarter 4th  quarter 1 quarter 2 quarters 3 quarters 4 quarters 
 Momentum 1 (Lowest Past Returns) 
Buy -0.56*** 8.60*** 2.51*** 1.17 2.57* -2.65*** -3.12*** -3.20*** -4.54*** 
 -0.62*** 4.80*** 2.51*** 1.17 2.57* -2.57*** -2.93*** -2.55*** -3.14*** 
Sell -1.41*** -3.84*** -2.84*** -0.69 -2.26* 1.44** 2.03** 2.09* 3.11** 
 -1.20*** -2.36*** -2.84*** -0.69 -2.26* 0.72* 0.96 0.94 1.57 
Buy-Sell 0.58*** 7.16*** 5.35*** 1.86** 4.83** -3.29*** -3.89*** -3.50*** -4.70*** 
 0.85*** 12.44*** 5.35*** 1.86** 4.83** -4.09*** -5.15*** -5.28*** -7.65*** 
 Momentum 2 
Buy 0.50*** 4.47*** 1.66*** 0.21 0.06 -1.14*** -1.53*** -1.95*** -2.56*** 
 0.56*** 2.77*** 1.66*** 0.21 0.06 -1.18*** -1.25*** -1.35*** -1.36*** 
Sell 0.59*** -1.49*** -0.99** -0.97* -1.30 1.50*** 2.84*** 3.31*** 3.74*** 
 0.59*** -0.66*** -0.99** -0.97* -1.30 0.64*** 1.47*** 1.59*** 1.87*** 
Buy-Sell -0.08 5.96*** 2.65*** 1.18 1.36 -2.64*** -4.37*** -5.25*** -6.30*** 
 -0.03 3.43*** 2.65*** 1.18 1.36 -1.82*** -2.72*** -2.94*** -3.23*** 
 Momentum 3 
Buy -1.28*** 2.90*** 1.85*** 2.21*** 0.25 -0.42 -0.80 -0.88 -1.26 
 -1.30*** 2.07*** 1.85*** 2.21*** 0.25 -0.47** -0.77** -0.59 -0.58 
Sell -0.99*** -0.73** -0.72* -1.41** -1.01 1.24*** 1.65*** 1.90*** 1.89** 
 -1.21*** -0.37** -0.72* -1.41** -1.01 0.79*** 1.06*** 1.10** 0.85 
Buy-Sell -0.29 3.63*** 2.57*** 3.62*** 1.26 -1.66*** -2.45*** -2.79*** -3.15*** 
 -0.08 2.44*** 2.57*** 3.62*** 1.26 -1.27*** -1.83*** -1.69*** -1.43** 
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 Momentum 4 
Buy -7.64*** 2.45*** 1.14*** 0.55 -1.15 -0.74** -0.80 -0.87 -1.13 
 -7.51*** 1.87*** 1.14*** 0.55 -1.15 -0.77*** -1.03** -1.13** -1.19* 
Sell -7.04*** -0.97*** -0.09 -0.69 0.50 -0.16 0.15 0.64 0.70 
 -7.16*** -0.39* -0.09 -0.69 0.50 0.29 0.35 0.26 0.16 
Buy-Sell -0.60 3.42*** 1.23** 1.24 -1.65 -0.58 -0.95* -1.51* -1.83* 
 -0.35 2.26*** 1.23** 1.24 -1.65 -1.06*** -1.38*** -1.39*** -1.35** 
 Momentum 5 (Highest Past Returns) 
Buy 9.38*** 3.67*** 1.01*** -0.33 -0.41 -1.46*** -2.09*** -2.83*** -3.03*** 
 4.35*** 2.98*** 1.01*** -0.33 -0.41 -0.91*** -1.27*** -1.65*** -1.93*** 
Sell -1.81*** 0.52 -0.59** 0.13 -0.54 0.08 -0.81 -1.05 -1.09 
 2.72*** 0.35 -0.59** 0.13 -0.54 0.06 -0.24 -0.68 -0.13 
Buy-Sell 11.20*** 3.15*** 1.59*** -0.46 0.13 -1.54*** -1.28** -1.79** -1.94** 
 1.64 2.64*** 1.59*** -0.46 0.13 -0.97*** -1.03** -0.98* -1.80*** 
 
Panel A reports the relation between herding activities and the 4-quarter returns of stocks prior to herds.  The first number is the number of herds, and the 
second is its percentage of the sample.  Panel B reports abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-market/momentum benchmark level by momentum 
quintiles.  For each cell, the first number is the mean returns for the sample of long herds which excludes 1-quarter herds while the second number is for 
whole sample.  The ‘Buy-Sell’ section reports the differences in the average returns for buy and sell herds; number in each cell is the average of the quarterly 
pair differences in returns between buy and sell sample.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 3. 7: Herding by Institutions over time 
 
Panel A.  Distribution of Herds by Herding Duration  
 Sell Herds Buy Herds   


















quarters Total Excl.1-period herd 
9,799 3,381 1,423 672 727 9,961 3,727 1,721 802 933 33,146 13,386 
1980-1988 
29.56 10.20 4.29 2.03 2.19 30.05 11.24 5.19 2.42 2.81 24.86 24.88 
13,311 4,650 1,949 868 1,116 13,132 5,067 2,295 1,115 1,197 44,700 18,257 
1989-1996 
29.78 10.40 4.36 1.94 2.50 29.38 11.34 5.13 2.49 2.68 33.52 33.93 
16,684 5,836 2,407 1,128 1,169 16,642 6,075 2,745 1,401 1,402 55,489 22,163 
1997-2004 
30.07 10.52 4.34 2.03 2.11 29.99 10.95 4.95 2.52 2.53 41.62 41.19 
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Panel B.  Distribution of Herds across Market Capitalization Subsamples 
 Sell Herds Buy Herds   


















quarters Total Excl.1-period herd 
1980-1988 
Small 3,210 965 366 142 133 3,509 1,090 472 185 158 10,230 3,511 
 31.38 9.43 3.58 1.39 1.30 34.30 10.65 4.61 1.81 1.54 30.86 26.23 
Medium 4,105 1,482 656 342 315 4,078 1,601 800 371 442 14,192 6,009 
 28.92 10.44 4.62 2.41 2.22 28.73 11.28 5.64 2.61 3.11 42.82 44.89 
Large 2,484 934 401 188 279 2,374 1,036 449 246 333 8,724 3,866 
 28.47 10.71 4.60 2.15 3.20 27.21 11.88 5.15 2.82 3.82 26.32 28.88 
1989-1996 
Small 5,928 1,841 785 324 375 6,090 2,045 895 397 347 19,027 7,009 
 31.16 9.68 4.13 1.70 1.97 32.01 10.75 4.70 2.09 1.82 42.57 38.39 
Medium 4,823 1,824 773 353 445 4,605 1,949 913 475 527 16,687 7,259 
 28.90 10.93 4.63 2.12 2.67 27.60 11.68 5.47 2.85 3.16 37.33 39.76 
Large 2,560 985 391 191 296 2,437 1,073 487 243 323 8,986 3,989 
 28.49 10.96 4.35 2.13 3.29 27.12 11.94 5.42 2.70 3.59 20.10 21.85 
1997-2004 
Small 8,051 2,627 1,156 550 519 8,400 2,727 1,232 597 605 26,464 10,013 
 30.42 9.93 4.37 2.08 1.96 31.74 10.30 4.66 2.26 2.29 47.69 45.18 
Medium 5,425 2,047 823 379 382 5,090 2,076 950 498 459 18,129 7,614 
 29.92 11.29 4.54 2.09 2.11 28.08 11.45 5.24 2.75 2.53 32.67 34.35 
Large 3,208 1,162 428 199 268 3,152 1,272 563 306 338 10,896 4,536 
 29.44 10.66 3.93 1.83 2.46 28.93 11.67 5.17 2.81 3.10 19.64 20.47 
 103
Panel C.  Abnormal Returns around Herding Period 
Size  Pre-herd period Herding periods Post herding periods 


















Small 4.88** 10.35*** 1.38 3.60** -1.28 -1.52 1.88 -0.74 -0.56 
 1.91 6.09*** 1.38 3.60** -1.28 -1.54** -0.70 -1.32 -1.52 
Medium 1.28 4.67*** 2.31*** 1.80*** 1.89 -1.18** -2.33*** -2.53** -3.10** 
 -0.17 3.69*** 2.31*** 1.80*** 1.89 -1.49*** -2.18*** -2.16*** -1.98*** 
Large 0.67 0.61 0.94 1.30 -0.65 -1.11** -1.37* -1.63* -2.46** 
 -0.10 0.49 0.94 1.30 -0.65 -0.63* -0.44 -0.35 -0.79 
All 1.82*** 4.47*** 2.00*** 1.81*** 0.91 -1.43*** -1.54** -2.21** -2.74*** 
 0.40 3.31*** 2.00*** 1.81*** 0.91 -1.37*** -1.43*** -1.59*** -1.70*** 
1989-1996 
Small 4.04*** 10.43*** 4.60*** 3.88*** 2.90 -3.74*** -5.06*** -6.08*** -6.99*** 
 1.34* 5.67*** 4.60*** 3.88*** 2.90 -2.02*** -2.03** -2.51** -3.15** 
Medium 2.03 2.71*** 2.58*** 0.27 1.97 -1.89*** -1.66** -1.50 -2.38* 
 0.02 2.56*** 2.58*** 0.27 1.97 -1.67*** -1.66*** -1.32** -1.83** 
Large 2.92*** -2.60*** -0.83** -0.67 2.91* 0.01 0.17 -0.46 0.25 
 0.13 -1.31*** -0.83** -0.67 2.91* 0.06 -0.05 -0.67 -0.06 
All 2.84*** 4.52*** 2.61*** 1.40** 2.40** -2.13*** -2.49*** -2.89*** -3.31*** 
 0.49 3.09*** 2.61*** 1.40** 2.40** -1.56*** -1.57*** -1.74*** -1.95*** 
1997-2004 
Small 4.43*** 14.82*** 7.36*** 0.94 2.25 -5.89*** -8.03*** -8.62*** -12.74*** 
 0.59 8.16*** 7.36*** 0.94 2.25 -5.06*** -6.20*** -5.51*** -7.99*** 
Medium 6.52** 7.40*** 1.77 -0.33 -2.03 -2.74*** -4.76*** -6.47*** -6.88*** 
 1.22 4.04*** 1.77 -0.33 -2.03 -1.69*** -2.68*** -3.48*** -4.11*** 
Large 2.47 -1.56 -0.36 -0.07 -0.40 -0.97 -2.15* -2.55* -1.86 
 -0.15 -1.05** -0.36 -0.07 -0.40 0.37 -0.20 0.01 0.34 
All 4.61*** 9.02*** 3.87*** 0.15 -0.32 -3.87*** -5.95*** -6.89*** -8.80*** 
 0.55 4.97*** 3.87*** 0.15 -0.32 -2.86*** -3.89*** -3.76*** -5.12*** 
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Panel D.  Abnormal Returns of Stocks that Institutions Tend to Change Their Herding Behavior 
Period Size rank Quarter0 Quarter1 Quarter2 Quarter3 Quarter4 
1980-1988 Small 35.96*** 1.53* -0.47 2.57** 3.79*** 
 Medium 29.25*** -1.52** 0.27 1.73*** 0.83 
 Large 24.61*** -1.19** -0.50 0.24 1.30*** 
 All 29.83*** -0.46 -0.01 1.37*** 1.91*** 
1989-1996 Small 43.77*** 1.18 1.23** 4.08*** 3.47*** 
 Medium 36.05*** -1.40** 0.61 1.77*** 1.36** 
 Large 28.12*** 0.43 -1.58 3.47** -1.31 
 All 37.57*** -0.01 0.92* 2.54*** 1.90*** 
1997-2004 Small 56.17*** 0.20 2.55** 1.78** 1.47 
 Medium 45.74*** -0.95 2.21** 1.57** 0.97 
 Large 38.53*** -1.30 2.44*** 1.60 0.17 
 All 50.23*** -0.37 2.53*** 1.61*** 0.81 
 
This table reports herding activities and their price impacts over three periods: 1980-1988, 1989-1996, and 1997-
2004.  Panel A reports the number of herds for different herding durations, their percentage of the sample, and the 
cumulative percentage.  Panel B reports herding activities by market capitalization.  Panel C reports past, 
contemporaneous, and post-herd abnormal returns by capitalizations. Because herds concentrate in small size stocks, 
which makes other samples relatively small, I combine two middle size quintiles and two top quintiles and name 
them medium and large size samples, respectively.  Panel D reports future abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-
to-market/momentum benchmark level by capitalization for: (i) stocks that are sold in herds and that experience the 
highest contemporaneous returns and (ii) stocks that are bought in herds and that experience the lowest 
contemporaneous returns.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
 
The dissertation examines the trading by institutions and its impact on the stock market.  
In the first essay, I document that changes in breadth of ownership are not only associated with 
future stock returns but also associated with future firm operating performances.  Moreover, 
changes in breadth appear unable to predict returns once I control for the information about 
performance of firms.  This suggests that changes in breadth can predict returns because 
institutions trade on information.  Consistent with this argument, I document that only active 
institutions could predict returns while passive entities are unable to do so.  These findings add 
new evidence to the debate over the return predictability in favor of the information hypothesis. 
In the second part of the essay, I document that it is common for herding by institutions 
to last for more than one quarter.  By taking into account the duration of herds, I document that 
there are reversals in returns following the end of herds and that it is possible to predict such 
reversals based on the current and past herding activities.  In terms of the sources of herding, this 
paper supports the hypothesis that herding by institutions is associated with information 
cascades. 
In general, the dissertation suggests that institutions are not the same in terms of the 
information advantage they possess.  It explains why in general institutions are smart investors 
whose trading helps to accelerate the price discovery process but in some specific situations, 
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BREADTHt Deciles 1-quarter 2-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 
1 -1.39%*** -2.56%*** -3.25%*** -3.11%*** 
2 -0.58%** -1.10%** -1.41%*** -1.42%*** 
3 -0.38% -0.59% -1.07%** -1.39%** 
4 -0.11% -0.07% -0.35% -0.15% 
5 -0.32% -0.33% -0.52% -0.55% 
6 -0.26% -0.23% -0.06% -0.12% 
7 0.07% 0.04% 0.04% -0.04% 
8 0.32% 0.29% 0.08% -0.33% 
9 0.92%*** 1.33%** 1.69%** 1.78%** 
10 1.61%*** 2.45%** 3.47%** 2.92%* 
P10–P1 3.00%*** 5.01%*** 6.72%*** 6.03%*** 
 
At the end of each quarter, stocks are first sorted into quintiles on market capitalization.  Stocks within the same size 
quintile are then assigned into deciles of changes in breadth, ∆BREADTHt.  Next, stocks are recombined based on 
∆BREADTHt deciles across size quintiles to form ten portfolios.  Stocks with market capitalization below the 20th 
percentile using NYSE break points are excluded.  Stocks are bought and hold for the next four quarters.  For each 
quarter t, equally-weighted average returns are calculated for each portfolio.  The numbers reported in this table are 
the abnormal returns adjusted for size/book-to-market benchmark.  The significance level is adjusted for serial 
correlation using a Newey-West estimator with a lag of up to four quarters.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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SIZEt quintiles ∆BREADTHt Deciles 2-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 
2 1 -3.78%*** -4.86%*** -4.54%*** 
 10 3.66%*** 4.37%*** 3.44%** 
 P10–P1 7.44%*** 9.23%*** 7.98%*** 
3 1 -2.75%*** -3.44%*** -3.73%*** 
 10 2.56% 3.95%** 3.07% 
 P10–P1 5.31%*** 7.39%*** 6.80%*** 
4 1 -1.51%** -1.50%* -1.21% 
 10 1.65% 2.26% 1.96% 
 P10–P1 3.15%*** 3.76%*** 3.17%* 
5 1 -1.16% -1.88%** -1.65% 
 10 1.13% 2.51% 2.79% 
 P10–P1 2.29%** 4.39%*** 4.44%*** 
 
At the end of each quarter, stocks are first sorted into quintiles on market capitalization.  Stocks within the same size 
quintile are assigned into deciles of changes in breadth, ∆BREADTHt.  For each size quintile, stocks are recombined 
based on ∆BREADTHt deciles to form ten equally-weighted portfolios.  Stock returns and portfolio returns are 
calculated in the same manner as in table 2.  This table reports mean values of abnormal returns adjusted for 
size/book-to-market benchmark.  The significant level is adjusted for serial-correlation using a Newey-West 
estimator with lag of four quarters.  ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. 
S 
 
 
 
 
